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ABSTRACT  
 
In this study, I compare three refugee administration models in the global south to one 
another: Egypt’s, Jordan’s, and Uganda’s. This research is conducted at what I 
believe is a curious moment of history, where host countries in the global south are 
encouraged by wealthier states to accept aid in exchange for keeping migrants in the 
south. In these circumstances, refugee administration models in host countries 
continue to operate, and new political approaches arise, such as the “Jordan Refugee 
Compact”. The aim of the comparative study is to spot both the successes and failures 
of each model in the three countries in terms of meeting the states’ obligations as per 
international law. I also assess new approaches adopted by some states, spot the 
lessons learned, and conclude by formulating my recommendations for improving 
further the existing model in Egypt.   
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I. Introduction to the Comparative Study 
A. Background on the Refugee Scene in Egypt  
Being a relatively-stable country in a rather unstable region, Egypt has increasingly 
become an attractive destination and transit country for asylum-seekers fleeing their 
countries.1 Conflicts, social unrest, and political instability in the region have triggered 
large influxes of people seeking refuge in Egypt. According to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of registered refugees and asylum-
seekers has increased at a rate of 24% over the course of 2017 and 2018 due to 
conflicts in Yemen and sub-Saharan African countries.2 Additionally, those who were 
newly registered with UNHCR, only in 2019, constituted 14% of the total number of 
refugees and asylum-seekers.3.     
In its latest Factsheet (as of February 2020), UNHCR has announced that the number of 
refugees and asylum-seekers in Egypt is 256,632 refugees and asylum-seekers. Out of 
those, a figure of 129,642 persons are Syrian refugees and asylum-seekers, constituting 
51% of the total refugee and asylum-seeker population.4 [For purposes of this research, 
the word ‘refugees’ in subsequent paragraphs will stand for refugees as well as asylum-
seekers whose status has not yet been determined.]    
The majority of refugees in Egypt are located in Greater Cairo, which has become home 
for the fifth largest urban refugee population in the world.5 6 
Some of the refugees in Egypt remain in the country in the hope of being resettled to 
Western countries such as Canada, Australia, the US, and other countries that have a 
very few resettlement slots for refugees. Only 3995 refugees were resettled last year, 
constituting an annual resettlement rate of 1.5% (vs. the aforementioned 14% of new 
arrivals)7. On the other hand, others come to Egypt with the intention to cross to Europe, 
 
1 TAREK BADAWY, THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES: PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (Jul. 2010), 
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13442/CARIM_ASN_2010_07.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y. 
2 UNHCR urges critical support for refugees in Egypt, UNHCR, (February 28, 2019), available at: 
https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/2/5c77e3154/unhcr-urges-critical-support-refugees-egypt.html. 
3 UNHCR EGYPT OPERATIONAL UPDATE 1 (Oct. - Dec. 2019), 
https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Egypt%20Operational%20Update%20-
%20October-December%202019.pdf 
4 UNHCR EGYPT FACT SHEET (Feb. 2020), https://www.unhcr.org/eg/wp-
content/uploads/sites/36/2020/03/UNHCR-Egypt_Fact-Sheet_February_2020.pdf 
5 BADAWY, supra note 1, at 1. 
6 Noura El Guindy, A Closer Look at the Life of Refugees in Egypt (May 2019) (submitted as a final paper to 
the course LAW5217 at the American University in Cairo). 
7 UNHCR, supra note 3, at 6. 
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whether directly through the northern coast of Egypt, or through crossing to a 
neighboring country. 8 
It is commonly understood that only two of the three durable solutions for refugees are 
available in Egypt, namely, resettlement and voluntary repatriation. Like some other 
countries in the global south, integration is a difficult-to-impossible option in Egypt.9 The 
Egyptian Immigration and Nationality Law leaves no room before refugees for obtaining 
citizenship or an indefinite residency permit. As for resettlement, UNHCR works on 
increasing refugees’ opportunities by pursuing different avenues such as family 
reunification.10  
According to Filippo Grandi, the UN Higher Commissioner for Refugees, eight out of 10 
refugees in Egypt cannot meet their basic needs.11 In subsequent sections, I will attempt 
to elaborate on the causes of this critical situation from the points of view of different 
scholars and publicists, and also from my humble perspective. For the purposes of this 
comparative study, I will explore refugee administration models in Jordan and Uganda, 
as two of the biggest host countries for refugees in the global south. I will conclude with 
recommendations based on the lessons learned from the approaches of the three 
countries. 
  
B. Research Questions 
My research question is whether Egypt’s refugee administration model meets Egypt’s 
international obligations as per the treaties to which Egypt is a Party State, such as the 
1951 Refugee Convention and other treaties of relevance. Furthermore, I will compare 
Egypt’s model to models in Jordan and Uganda. My purpose of this comparison is to 
assess whether these models meet their respective states’ international obligations, then 
to spot useful approaches and patterns of governance in those models that will help me 
formulate my recommendations for Egypt’s model.  
The first part of the thesis will be a research on the current legal situation of refugees in 
Egypt. I will explore the rights granted to refugees as well as challenges faced by them 
 
8 AMIRA HETABA ET AL., REFUGEE ENTITLEMENTS IN EGYPT 1 (Feb. 2020), 
http://schools.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/cmrs/Documents/Refugee%20Entitlements%20Report%20%281%29.pdf 
[hereinafter CMRS Report]. 
9 Martin Jones, Legal Empowerment and Refugees on the Nile: the Very Short History of Legal 
Empowerment and Refugee Legal Aid in Egypt, 19 IJHR 308, 309 (2015). 
10 UNHCR, supra note 4, at 3. 
11 UNHCR, supra note 2.  
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and the available discourse on Egypt’s Policies. The second part of the thesis will 
explore the refugee administration systems in Jordan and Uganda, their relevant legal 
frameworks, and the rights granted to refugees in both countries. I will also explore 
whether legal issues highlighted in the first part were addressed/avoided in Jordan 
and/or Uganda. I will conclude with recommendations in the final chapter.  
 
C. Significance 
As a legal researcher, I have always wanted to read a comparative study of Egypt’s 
refugee administration model and models of other countries, especially ones in the global 
south. Unfortunately, most of the scholarship available on the subject matter addresses 
the challenges faced by refugees in each country on its own, but does not compare 
Egypt’s refugee administration system to systems in other countries.  
There is only one exception, that is, the significant article Hosting Guests, Creating 
Citizens: Models of Refugee Administration in Jordan and Egypt published in 2017. 12  In 
this article, Rochelle Davis et al. compare the Egyptian model to the Jordanian one and 
conclude that both models have turned over time from relatively inclusive models to 
exclusionary ones that are dependent on international aid that generates aid hierarchies 
among refugees according to their nationalities.13 Further discourse from that article will 
be presented in a subsequent sub-section. 
Other than this article, there were not any comparative studies that included Egypt and 
other states. Therefore, I have determined to conduct this research myself in hope that 
its outcomes would appeal to a technocrat in power and inspire him/her to make a policy 
change in Egypt.  
We have the statistics that speak louder than words. 1.5% of refugees in Egypt depart to 
resettlement countries annually, while the fate of the rest remains unknown. For that 
reason, the discourse on the living conditions of refugees in Egypt, especially from a 
legal perspective, should be further explored. 
Another glimpse of hope I see for refugees is Egypt’s increasing interest in battling illegal 
immigration. In October 2018, Egypt signed with the European Union (EU) an agreement 
 
12 Rochelle Davis et al., Hosting Guests, Creating Citizens: Models of Refugee Administration in Jordan and 
Egypt, 36 REFUG. SURV. Q. 1 (2017).  
13 Noura El Guindy, Exploring Egypt’s Refugee Administration Model (December 2019) (submitted as a final 
paper to the course MRS5100 at the American University in Cairo). 
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to that end, which amounted to €60 million. The agreement aims to end illegal 
immigration by battling the economic and social reasons leading to it in the first place.1415 
In my opinion, one way to reduce the numbers of illegal immigration of migrants from 
Egypt is to offer them an opportunity to live in Egypt as per the standards of its 
international obligations. That is where my research steps in, assessing the existing legal 
arrangements Egypt and introducing new ones that are followed in other countries.  
 
D. Methodology 
I will mainly rely on academic articles for obtaining information and for making 
arguments. I will also resort to reports generated by humanitarian organizations on the 
ground when necessary. However, the arguments that I will present will be emphasized 
in academic sources for the most part.  
As for my method of choice for this study, I will use the functional method to spot and 
compare laws of other countries to those of Egypt, and I will specifically use a recent, 
widely-circulated version of functionalism that is promoted by Ralf Michaels, a renowned 
scholar and expert in comparative law. Nevertheless, I will first introduce functionalism in 
the traditional sense. 
As explained by Stephen A. Smith, functionalist comparative scholarship is where legal 
rules and establishments are compared in terms of the functions that they serve, rather 
than their wording or their classification in the legal systems in which they are found. 
Functional comparative scholars first identify the problems or the needs, then they 
analyze how these needs are met/how these problems are solved through both legal and 
non-legal establishments.16 
The functional method has been regarded as the most convenient method of 
comparative legal studies17. This is emphasized by the widely-quoted words of Konrad 
Zweigert and Hein Kötz who developed and promoted functionalism: “The basic 
methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality. From this basic 
 
14 Egypt, EU sign 2 agreements worth €135m to provide jobs, battle illegal immigration, Egypt Independent, 
18 October 2018. Available at: https://egyptindependent.com/egypt-eu-sign-2-agreements-worth-e135m-to-
provide-jobs-battle-illegal-immigration/ 
15 El Guindy, supra note 6. 
16 Stephen A. Smith, Comparative Legal Scholarship as Ordinary Legal Scholarship, 5 J. COMP. L. 331, 
337-338 (2010). 
17 Julie de Coninck. The Functional Method of Comparative Law: ‘Quo Vadis’?, 74 RABEL J. COMP. INT'L 
PRIVATE L. (RabelsZ) 318, 322 (2010). 
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principle stem all the other rules which determine the choice of laws to compare, the 
scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of comparative law, and so on.”18 
According to Zweigert and Kötz, the only way to compare certain laws of different legal 
systems is for those laws to have the same function, as only “comparables” can be 
compared. They argued that a comparative lawyer must pose his/her research question 
in “purely functional terms”, and not according to the concept of the comparatist’s own 
legal system.19     
Moreover, a significant feature in their version of functionalism is that they believed that 
there is a great deal of similarity in the results “developed nations” achieve as they solve 
legal problems. In other words, they argued that different legal systems end up having 
the same or very similar solutions to legal problems to an extent that there almost exists 
a praesumptio similitudinis, i.e. a presumption that legal solutions in different societies 
are the same, or at least very similar.20 According to that view, if a comparatist found that 
there were different legal solutions, he/she is required to verify that the questions he/she 
posed were in purely functional terms.21 
This traditional theory of legal solutions being presumably similar has been criticized by 
“difference theorists”. They argued that it pressured the comparatist to think of similarities 
and to not pay as much attention to differences, or to marginalize those differences. A 
comparatist must be neutral and not favor similarities over differences in the process of 
his/her research. 22 They stress that similarities that appear before a comparative 
researcher should be looked at with caution, as they might result from “a reductionist 
approach or cultural imperialism”, in Julie de Coninck’s words.23 Those critics promote a 
focus on differences between legal systems that almost amounts, in turn, to a 
“praesumptio dissimilitudis”, an assumption of the “singularity of legal systems”, as Julie 
de Coninck puts it. From difference theorists’ point of view, different cultural contexts 
produce different legal systems; each legal system is unique on its own.24 As Pierre 
Legrand puts it, the discipline of comparative law is in itself a pursuit of difference.2526 
 
18 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 34 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford 
University Press, 2nd edn, 1992) (1987). 
19 Id. 
20 De Coninck, supra note 17, at 330. 
21 RALF MICHAELS, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 369, chapter 10, (eds. Mathias Reimann and 
Reinhard Zimmerman, 1st edn. 2006) (2006). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 370 (According to Michaels, this theory has been accused of being ‘reductionist’, as similarities are 
believed to appear when a researcher take the subjects of comparison out of their national contexts). 
24 De Coninck, supra note 17, at 332.  
25 PIERRE LEGRAND, LE DROIT COMPARS 37 (Presses Universitaires de France, 1999) (1991). 
26 Geoffrey Samuel, Taking Methods Seriously (Part Two), 2 J. COMP. L. 210, 229-230 (2007). 
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Another important feature of Zweigert and Kötz version of functionalism, is that they 
argued that comparatists must, in the process of their research, take legal rules out of 
their national contexts. In other words, to distill them from its cultural circumstances and 
to look at those rules as neutral functions.27 The purpose of this exercise is for the 
researcher to avoid the constraints of looking at those rules from the perspective of 
his/her legal system.28  
According to some academic views, there might be a number of reasons why Zweigert 
and Kötz called for distilling the rules from their cultural contexts. First, most comparative 
law focused on private law issues that might be less “culturally-determined” compared to 
other branches of law. Secondly, the scope of comparative law was mainly that of 
European legal constructions that might have similar backgrounds. In the time being, 
comparative law studies include in its scope non-European legal systems. Thirdly, the 
1970’s Zweigert and Kötz version of functionalism developed in a time where there was a 
need to focus on similarities, as war over differences remained in the memory and 
conscious of European thinkers. 2930  
With regards on how to deal with cultural circumstances, there are two extreme stances 
among scholars, as Stephen A. Smith explains. The first is what some comparative 
scholars believe, is that it is almost useless to compare laws of two different legal 
regimes, such as the English and the French one, because of the cultural differences 
between both countries, for example the philosophical grounds upon which the laws 
were founded. The other position, which is adopted by traditional functionalists and 
inspired by Zweigert and Kötz earlier stance, supposes that those differences are “largely 
irrelevant”. In a middle place between those two views, most comparative scholars place 
themselves. They give attention to cultural differences, but not to an extent that they 
would regard a comparative study between different legal regimes as pointless or futile.31 
That middle stance, being a moderate and a widely-agreed-upon position among 
comparatists, will be my approach to this comparative study. I will compare Egypt’s 
system to systems in other countries of the global south that might have different cultural 
and societal foundations. However, I will take those differences into consideration while 
comparing those regimes to one another and while drawing my recommendations. As 
 
27 ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 18. 
28 For further explanation of this feature of Zweigert and Kötz functionalism, see BART WERNAART, THE 
ENFORCEABILITY OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD. A COMPARATIVE STUDY 31-32 (Dec. 2013), 
https://library.wur.nl/WebQuery/wurpubs/fulltext/282480. 
29 MICHAELS, supra note 21, at 370. 
30  WERNAART, supra note 28 at 39. 
31 Smith, supra note 16, at 347. 
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will be explained in subsequent paragraphs, the functionalist scholar Ralf Michaels’ 
version of functionalism, namely equivalence functionalism, entails that the comparative 
researcher must take into account the cultural and societal background of a legal solution 
in study.32  
In Ralf Michaels’ book the Functional Method of Comparative Law, the author first 
introduced a number of features of functionalism that all functionalist scholars agree 
upon (regardless of their chosen ‘version’ of functionalism).33 I will list these agreed-upon 
features and will explain how I apply them to this study. 
First, there is a focus on the effects of the law, rather than its wording. All functionalists 
are concerned with the practice of the law.34 I follow the same approach in this study. For 
example, Egypt is a party to several bilateral agreements that might be of significance for 
the rights refugees of certain nationalities. However, I am interested to explore whether 
these agreements are being applied. Also, I will check for laws that fulfill certain functions 
even if they had different phrasing. For example, a country might not grant refugees 
citizenship, but give them permanent residency and citizen rights.   
 Another common feature in all versions of functionalism is the fact that a function is the 
point of comparison that inspired the author to make the comparison in the first place. As 
a consequence, different legal systems can be compared to one another if they serve the 
same function. Even non-legal systems can be compared to legal ones in that sense 
(that is, if they serve the same function).35 In my research, it has been common to find 
that a function (relating to refugees’ matters) that is carried out by a legal institution in 
one country is carried out by a non-legal one in another (or even by a non-governmental 
entity). 
Lastly, function serves as an evaluative criterion in several versions of functionalism. The 
better law fulfills further its function.36 In this research, the function/evaluative criterion is 
whether the concerned states abide by their international obligations towards refugees. 
The better law, in that sense is the law that serves further this function. 
Ralf Michaels then introduced the version of functionalism he believes is the most 
suitable for comparative law: equivalence functionalism. He argues that it is the most 
robust version of functionalism and that it is the core of the concept of functionalism 
 
32 MICHAELS, supra note 21 at 358-359. 
33 Id. at 342. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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promoted by Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz.37 Nevertheless, he argues that the way 
they formulated the concept of similarity is misleading. In his explanation of this concept, 
there is not a “similarity” of legal solutions, but rather “functional equivalence” of them.38  
Solutions are neither identical nor necessary, but rather multiple and possible. 
Equivalence functionalism recognizes the uniqueness of every society embodied in its 
choice of one solution out of all its other multiple alternatives (i.e. among all other 
“functionally equivalent” solutions). Consequently, the comparatist must consider the 
cultural, national background behind the chosen solutions in comparison. As explained 
earlier in this chapter, I will use this approach of considering national backgrounds while 
comparing legal solutions that are proposed or in application in the three countries of this 
study.3940 
I chose for this study two countries in the global south, Jordan and Uganda, because a 
fair assessment of Egypt’s practice would, in my opinion, require a comparative study 
with countries of challenging economic situations. There is much criticism of Egypt laws 
and practice with regards to refugees. Yet, there might be a possibility that this criticism 
is in fact inspired by authors’ comparing Egypt’s laws to those in much wealthier 
countries, which is unrealistic in my point of view.  
My aim from this study is to 1. assess which countries have a refugee administration 
model that meets its respective countries’ international obligations; and, 2. to spot the 
useful approaches and patterns of governance in those countries. Spotting these 
practices would allow me further to structure my recommendations on how to deal with 
issues faced by refugees in Egypt. 
Lastly, I would like to explain the reasons why I chose Uganda and Jordan in particular 
for the comparative part.  
As for Jordan, it is comparable to Egypt in several aspects. On one hand, it has been 
deeply affected by the Syrian crisis. Just like Egypt, the largest refugee population there 
constitutes of Syrians. Meanwhile, the domestic law governs the matters of refugees in 
the same manner like Egypt’s law does: mainly through several renewable decrees, 
rather than a single legislation on the matter. In addition, there appears to be similarities 
on how Jordan and Egypt formulated their refugee policies; for example, the influence of 
 
37 Id. at 363. 
38 Id. at 371-372. 
39 Id. at 358-259. 
40 See also WERNAART, supra note 28 at 40. He provides a thorough explanation of Ralf Michael’s concept of 
equivalence functionalism. 
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political events on these policies. Lastly, several academics criticize both countries’ 
policies for treating refugees differently according to their nationalities. I think that these 
similarities will be of value to the comparative study, especially in terms of spotting the 
patterns that led to the formulation of those policies. 
On the other hand, comparing Egypt’s laws to those of Uganda will be beneficial for a 
number of reasons. First, the fact that both countries are signatories to a large number of 
treaties of relevance to refugees makes a starting common ground in order to assess 
which country has a legal framework that further abides by its international convention. It 
will also be useful to explore the discourse on whether the seemingly-progressive laws in 
Uganda generate any challenges that are similar to those taking place in Egypt.  
Lastly, an important reason for my choice is my own eagerness to check-facts with 
regards to the widely praised refugee system in Uganda, as well as the recent policy 
reforms in Jordan (known as “the Jordan Compact”). While Morocco is seemingly a more 
comparable country to Egypt for this study (being a transit country with a coastline that 
has been used to cross to Europe), my curiosity as a researcher has driven me to 
choose Uganda and Jordan. For Uganda, my aim is to assess the famously-progressive 
system. On the other hand, I choose Jordan with an aim to explore the recent Compact 
and whether it was a “game changer”. 
 
E. Scope  
The research will mainly focus on three essential legal rights: right to work, right to 
education, access to healthcare. It will address the challenges faced by refugees with a 
focus on those produced by the law (e.g. reservations to international conventions, law 
provisions, regulations, etc.). While there are other serious challenges that are not law-
related (such as lack of hospitality and resentment against refugees by some people in 
the society), I will mostly focus on the law-related ones for the purpose of the 
comparative study.  
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II. Egypt’s Refugee Administration Model 
A. The Legal Framework Governing the Matters of Refugees in Egypt 
Egypt is a party to a number of global and regional refugee conventions. It acceded in 
1981 to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol, with reservations to five provisions relating to public status, rationing, 
education, relief, and labor terms.41  
In addition, Egypt is a party to the Organization of African Unity’s Convention Governing 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU Convention) that adopts a broader 
definition of a refugee. It is also a party to the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Although the latter does 
not concern itself with refugees42, it has provisions against forced deportation.43 
Furthermore, Egypt is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 
(CRC). As per the convention, the rights present in this convention apply to refugee 
children as well. It is also a State Party to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The rights enshrined in the latter extends to 
refugees as will be explained in subsequent sections. 
In addition to all the above, Egypt had signed in 1954 a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with UNHCR Cairo office (even before it signed the 1951 Refugee Convention). 
According to the MoU, UNHCR shall conduct Refugee Status Determination (RSD) on 
behalf of the Egyptian State, where Egypt commits itself to issuing residency permits to 
these populations given the fulfillment of due requirements.44  
Lastly, Article 91 of the Egyptian constitution provides the right to seek political asylum 
‘for every foreigner persecuted for defending the peoples’ interest, human rights, peace 
or justice’. It also prohibits extradition of political refugees.45 
Some academics root the general absence of rights of refugees in Egypt to its 
reservations to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Katarzyna Grabska, for 
 
41 George Sadek, Refugee Law and Policy: Egypt, available at: https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-
law/egypt.php. 
42 UNTC, Signatories to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
9&chapter=4&clang=_en. 
43 Article 3(1). 
44 BADAWY, supra note 1 at 4. 
45 El Guindy, supra note 13. 
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example, argues that these reservations are one of the reasons for limited protection of 
refugees in Egypt.46 Below I will explore in subsequent sections some of the challenges 
refugees face in Egypt with regards to obtaining their rights. 
B. Right to Work 
First, it is important to establish that refugees are theoretically allowed to work in Egypt. 
Yet, they face practical difficulties in the highly-regulated process of obtaining permission 
to exercise this right.  
Although there is a common misconception that Egypt has made a reservation to the 
1951 Convention Article providing the right to work, both Gabriel Koehler-Derrick and 
Tarek Badawy explain that this is not the case. In fact, Egypt has made no reservation to 
Article 17 on Wage-earning Employment. According to this article, refugees shall be 
given the most favorable treatment given to foreigners with regards to employment, 
which means that they must fulfill the requirements that need to be met by the most 
favored foreigners in order for them to work in the host state. However, Article 17 
encourages states to have a sympathetic consideration with regards to refugees who 
cannot meet the aforementioned requirements due to their situation as refugees.47   
In addition, Article 17 further provides that refugees who meet one of certain conditions 
shall be exempted from any measures that are imposed by the government on the 
employment of aliens to protect national labor. These conditions are either to: reside in 
the country for three years, marry a citizen, or become a parent of a citizen child.48  
The only reservations Egypt has made with regards to work are related to Articles on 
labor legislation and workplace protection, but not to the actual right to work. 
In addition, the right to work is provided to refugees under ICESCR, where Article 6 
states that State Parties recognize and safeguard the right to work, “which includes the 
right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or 
accepts”. Furthermore, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
 
46 Katarzyna Grabska, Living on the margins: The analysis of the livelihood strategies of Sudanese refugees 
with closed files in Egypt (Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 
6, 2005). 
47 CMRS Report, supra note 8, at 94. 
48 MICHAEL KAGAN, SHARED RESPONSIBILITY IN A NEW EGYPT: A STRATEGY FOR REFUGEE PROTECTION 15-16 
(Sep. 2011), 
http://schools.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/cmrs/reports/Documents/KaganRefugeePolicyEgypt1109.pdf. 
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(CESCR) stated in General Comment 20 that the Covenant rights apply to everyone 
including refugees.49 
In recent report on Refugee Entitlements in Egypt by the Center for Migration and 
Refugee Studies (CMRS) at the American University in Cairo, Amira Hetaba et al. make 
several arguments that will be elaborated in the next paragraphs. They conclude that 
refugees are entitled to favorable treatment with regards to work as per Egypt’s regional 
and bilateral agreements as well as domestic laws and decrees applying to specific 
nationalities. The favorable treatment provided in those instruments shall be extended to 
refugees as per Article 17 of the Refugee Convention stating that refugees shall be 
accorded the most favorable treatment provided to foreigners with regards to wage-
earning employment.  
 
1. Favorable Treatment Accorded to Some Nationalities in Regional Accords and 
Bilateral Agreements 
First, the Protocol for the Treatment of Palestinians in Arab States ratified by Egypt in 
1965 provides that Palestinians have the right to work in Egypt with the same conditions 
as nationals. Subsequently, Palestinian and non-Palestinian refugees can claim their 
right to work on a par with nationals. However, there are views that suggest that the 
Protocol is not implemented in Egypt as explained by the CMRS report.  
Secondly, according to the 2004 Four Freedoms Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, 
Sudanese are allowed to work “in any profession, crafts, and other works”. This favorable 
access to the labor market is subsequently entitled to all refugees. As will be explained in 
the section Politics Influencing the Rights of Refugees in Egypt, it has been reported that 
the agreement is not fully implemented in reality. 
Thirdly, another bilateral agreement that grants foreigners favorable treatment is the 
Agreement between Egypt and Greece for the Promotion of Bilateral Cooperation 
Concerning Labor Matters. By means of the agreement, Greek workers shall receive the 
same treatment as nationals. Subsequently, refugees can claim their right to work up to 
the same standard. 
Last but not least, Article 5 of the Agreement between Egypt and Jordan concerning the 
Cooperation in Work Force Matters provides Jordanians working in Egypt, once they 
 
49 Text of General Comment 20 can be found at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a60961f2.html. 
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obtain a work permit, the right to be treated like the local workforce. In the same manner 
as in previous paragraphs, refugees can claim their right to the treatment provided by 
this agreement. 
 
2. Favorable Treatment Accorded to Some Nationalities in Domestic Law  
There are certain nationalities that enjoy a range of exemptions with regards to the 
requirements of obtaining a work permit. These nationalities are: the Sudanese, 
Lebanese, Palestinians, Greeks, and Italians. Next is the list of exemptions provided by a 
number of Ministerial Decrees to these nationalities. 
As will be explained in the next section, a condition for a foreigner obtaining a work 
permit is to not compete with Egyptians applying to the same job. However, certain 
categories of foreigners are exempted from this condition, including: foreigners whose 
spouses are Egyptians, political refugees whose refugee status has been determined by 
the Presidency (not to be confused with regular refugees whose status has been 
determined by UNHCR), Palestinians with duly-issued passports, persons without 
specified nationality who have been residing continuously and permanently in Egypt, 
individuals with an ordinary residence permit for five years or a special residence permit 
for ten years, and those who have been born in Egypt and lived in it for fifteen years 
without leaving it for more than three months per year. Similarly, refugees should benefit 
from this exemption. 
Other exemptions provided by the law to certain categories of foreigners are: 
- The exemption provided by the Ministry of Manpower and Migration Decree No. 305 of 
2015 to Sudanese, Lebanese, Palestinians, Italians, and Greeks who are staying no 
longer than five years in Egypt from paying work permit fees. 
- The exemption provided by the Ministry of Manpower and Migration Decree No. 485 of 
2010 Decree to Palestinians from the prohibition of foreigners to work in customs 
clearance.  
- The exemption provided by the Ministry of Manpower and Migration Decree No. 485 of 
2010 Decree to employers hiring Sudanese or Palestinians from submitting certain 
paperwork to the Ministry of Manpower and Migration. 
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As per Article 17 of the Refugee Convention, refugees should be able to claim their right 
to work under these privileged conditions.50 However, this is not the practice as will be 
explained in subsequent sections. 
3. Obtaining Work Permits: a Highly-Regulated Process  
Legally speaking (given the above), refugees are allowed to apply and obtain work 
permits under the most favorable conditions accorded to foreigners. However, refugees 
experience the full, lengthy, process of attempting to obtain a work permit without 
enjoying any exemptions (except for the non-competition with nationals exemption; only 
for some refugees who are married to Egyptians). 51 
Before exploring the actual implementation of the law, I will list the steps required to 
obtain a work permit for the purpose of explaining the length and complexity of this 
highly-regulated process. 
As explained thoroughly by the CMRS report 52, a foreigner who has an authorization of 
entry and residency for work purposes could apply to obtain a visa, given that the 
workplace he/she will be employed at has no more than 10% of foreign workers. As per 
Article 5 the Ministry of Manpower and Migration Decree No. 305 of 2015, the 
requirements for a foreigner to apply to the visa are as follows: 
- His/her qualifications should meet those required for the job; 
- His/her years of professional experience should be at least three years; 
- If the law in Egypt requires having a license to work in a specific profession, he/she has 
to have this license; 
- There has to be an economic benefit of hiring a foreigner at this position; 
- There should be no competition by Egyptians applying to this job; 
- Upon his/her employment, two Egyptian assistants should be hired and trained by this 
foreigner; 
- Priority should be given to foreigners who have been born in Egypt and permanently 
reside in it.  
 
50 CMRS Report, supra note 8, at 105-106. 
51 Id. at 109. 
52 Id. at 107-108. 
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 In addition to those rigorous conditions they must meet in order to obtain work permits, 
some researchers report that foreigners, including refugees, must have a ‘powerful’ 
employer to sponsor them.53 Most refugees do not meet those conditions except for a 
very limited, educated elite.  
 
4. Regulations of Self-Employment: Obtaining a Business License  
In order for refugees to start a licensed business, they must go through the same 
process as foreigners do. First, they must submit certain documentations to the Ministry 
of Investment and await its approval. Next, a security check is conducted where the 
applicants must pass a security clearance successfully. Finally, a renewable one-year 
business license and a residence permit are issued. Furthermore, Ministry of Investment 
information centers are accessible to both citizens and non-citizens to provide guidance 
and assistance with business-related matters.54 
 
5. Practice of the Law: What Takes Place on the Ground 
The first problem is that there is no codification in the Egyptian law for the exemption 
from restrictions imposed on foreigners’ work provided by the Refugee Convention to 
refugees whose spouses or children hold the nationality of the host state, or those who 
have completed three years of residence in the host state. Therefore, refugees in Egypt 
do not benefit from this exemption, although Egypt has made no reservation to this end.  
Furthermore, the process of obtaining a work permit is reported to be difficult for some 
refugees and almost impossible for others.55 As a consequence, Koehler-Derrick 
explains, refugees resort to non-contractual forms of labor. This has several implications 
on refugees working conditions, among which is the fact that refugees cannot avail 
themselves of the rights and benefits secured by Egypt’s Labor Law such as: maternity 
and sickness leaves, pensions, etc.56 Another implication is the fact that a large number 
of female African refugees, namely the Somali, Sudanese, Eritreans and Ethiopians, 
resort to domestic work in Egyptian households in affluent neighborhoods as a means to 
 
53 KAGAN, supra note 48, at 17-18. 
54 CMRS Report, supra note 8, at 113. 
55 Id. at 116. 
56 Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Egypt: Towards a culture of Legal Integration? Cairo's Urban refugees and 
Egypt's reservations to the 1951 Convention (2004), available at: 
http://www.altrodiritto.unifi.it/frontier/koehler.htm.   
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make an income. Domestic work is described by Amira Hetaba et al. as the least 
protected area of work as it is explicitly excluded from government’s sight and 
regulations, which exposes those workers to multiple risks, including abuse and sexual 
violence. Nevertheless, they tend to become the principal breadwinners in their families 
as the income they make is usually higher than the income males could bring in by 
working typical informal jobs such as daily laborers.5758 Others resort to jobs that are 
typically of low pay such as drivers and street vendors. In addition, the CMRS report 
provides accounts of refugees who report the long hours of these jobs, and the 
insufficiency of income to cover daily expenses.59  
Ironically enough, Tarek Badawy reports that, despite the fact that refugees have almost 
no actual access to formal work market as elaborated above, there is a general 
unwelcoming sentiment against refugees as there is a misconception among some 
Egyptians that they are competing with the public over the already-limited work 
opportunities.60 
With regards to the privileged status provided to Palestinians and Sudanese nationals as 
per the Casablanca Protocol and the Four Freedoms Agreement, practice does not seem 
to reflect the promised on-a-par-with-nationals status.61  
As for Sudanese refugees, focus groups conducted by CMRS revealed that the 
Sudanese still find great difficulties landing a job for a range of reasons, including the fact 
that many employers do not accept UNHCR cards as IDs. However, Hetaba et al. 
conclude that it is unclear whether or not the agreement is being fully implemented in the 
sense that Sudanese workers would not need to obtain a work permit.62 As for 
Palestinian nationals, it has been reported that the relaxed regulations provided by the 
Casablanca Protocol stopped being implemented since 1978 for political reasons.63 
(Further reflection on the matter will be provided in a subsequent section on the influence 
of politics on refugees’ rights). 
Turning to self-employment, CMRS researchers report that refugees voiced in focus 
groups a reality that is different from the procedure explained earlier for obtaining a 
business license. For many refugees, receiving a business license is almost an 
 
57 Id. 
58 El Guindy, supra note 13. 
59 CMRS Report, supra note 8, at 116. 
60 BADAWY, supra note 1. 
61 CMRS Report, supra note 8, at 116. 
62 Id. at 116-118. 
63 Id. 
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impossible task.64 The most challenging aspects are passing the security clearance and 
proving to have financial resources that are sufficient from the perspective of the 
decision-makers at the Ministry.65  
According to the CMRS report, some refugees resort to bringing in an Egyptian partner in 
order to facilitate the issuance of the license, as Egyptians are thought to more likely 
pass the security clearance than foreigners. However, some refugees complain that their 
Egyptian partners do not contribute much to the day-to-day work at their shared 
businesses but still demand most of the profit. As a result of these difficulties, some 
refugees avoid applying for a license for their small businesses. 66     
 
C. Right to Education 
1. Right to Education in International and Bilateral Instruments to which Egypt is a 
Party 
While Egypt has made a reservation on the article pertaining to education in the Refugee 
Convention, it has related commitments as per other legal instruments. 
As a signatory to ICESCR, Egypt is obliged as per Articles 13 and 14 to provide 
compulsory primary education that is free to all. While ICESCR allows its developing 
State Parties the gradual realization of some of its provisions, the CESCR explains in its 
general comments that there is a ‘minimum core’ that has to be immediately provided by 
State Parties regardless of their level of development.67  Paragraph 10 of General 
Comment No. 3: the Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the 
Covenant) explains that the provision of primary education is included in this ‘minimum 
core’, unlike secondary and higher education that could be realized by States in a 
gradual manner.68  
ICESCR further provides in Article 13 that secondary education must be made ‘generally 
available’ and ‘accessible’ to all, while higher education shall be made ‘generally 
accessible’ on the basis of capacity. CESCR explained in paragraphs 6 and 13 of 
General Comment No. 13 the meaning of availability and accessibility to that end. 
 
64 Id. at 116-117. 
65 Id. at 113. 
66 Id. At 116-117. 
67 CMRS Report, supra note 8, at 126. 
68 Id. 
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Availability means that students are to be allowed in secondary education regardless of 
their apparent capacity, and that schools are geographically distributed in a manner that 
ensures their access by all. Accessibility, on the other hand, means: (1) that there shall 
be no discrimination in law or in fact regarding access of education; (2) education shall 
be physically accessible, i.e. access is within safe physical reach; and, (3) economically 
accessible. This means that secondary schools, even though it needs not to be free-of-
charge, shall not require a prohibitive fee that would limit its access to vulnerable 
children. In addition, States Parties are obliged by Article 13 to move progressively 
towards making secondary and higher education free to all.   
On the other hand, CRC, to which Egypt is a signatory, states that primary education 
shall be made available and free to all children in Article 28(1)(a). With regards to 
secondary education, Article 28(1)(b) encourages states to make secondary education 
available and accessible to all children and move towards free education or a subsidized 
one (in the sense of providing financial assistance). Furthermore, Article 22(1) states that 
all rights present in the Convention apply to refugee children. UNESCO stated that the 
core obligation of providing free primary education must be immediately realized by all 
states.  
Furthermore, Egypt is committed to its obligations as per the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). Article 5 of ICERD 
provides that State parties are obliged to prohibit any discrimination and ensure equality 
before the law in the enjoyment of several rights, including the right to education. In 
addition, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) provides in 
its Recommendation XXX on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, paragraph 30, that 
educational institutions must be open for everyone including the children on non-
documented immigrants.69 
In addition, the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, which Egypt 
ratified in 1962, provides in Article 3 that states must provide access to education to 
foreign nationals who are residents in its territory equally as nationals. In addition, Article 
4 provides that states must formulate and develop national policies towards making 
primary education compulsory and free to all, while secondary education shall be 
available and accessible to all, and tertiary education shall be equally accessible to all on 
the basis of individual capacity. 
 
69 Id. at 128. 
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As for bilateral instruments pertaining to Education, there is an agreement between 
Egypt and Palestine. The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Education between 
the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization representing the Palestinian National Authority was adopted in 1999. 
According to the agreement, Palestinian students do not need to sit for additional exams 
by the Ministry of Education, as the certificates they obtained in Palestine will count as 
equivalent to certificates obtained in Egypt.  
However, the cooperation agreement has a serious drawback, as it covers Palestinians 
who obtained their previous certificates in Palestine, and not Palestinians who were 
educated in Syria, for instance, or elsewhere. Furthermore, it is unclear whether or not it 
is implemented.70  
 
2. Right to Education in Domestic Law 
Despite the rights enshrined in the international and bilateral instruments listed above, 
domestic law in Egypt does not entirely reflect Egypt’s international obligations. On the 
domestic level, there is a confusion among academics on the current implementation of 
education rights of refugee children. This is due to the fact that there is a large number of 
decrees and legal provisions governing the subject matter.71 On one hand, Article 52 of 
Egypt’s Child Law states that education is an entitlement for every child regardless of 
nationality. This is contradicted by a number of decrees that only allows children of 
specific nationalities to access public schools. 
Article 6 of the Ministerial decree no. 284/2014 (and before which: Ministerial decree no. 
24/1992) states that non-Egyptian students are not allowed access to public schools, 
except for a few categories. These categories include: Libyan and Sudanese children 
(and a couple of other nationalities which are not in the scope of this research) and 
children who have received a scholarship from UNHCR. They also include Palestinian 
children whose parents work at the public sector or military, and the children of political 
refugees who were granted the refugee status by the President Office under Article 53 of 
 
70 Id. at 143. 
71 TAREK BADAWY, REPORT ON HIGHLY SKILLED MIGRATION IN EGYPT, 4 (CARIM. Vol. Legal Module. 
Prod. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. San Domenico di Fiesole: European 
University Institute, 2010). 
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the former constitution.72 73 74 However, Article 11 of the Decree stipulates that those 
categories are required to pay school additional fees.  
In addition to those categories, Yemeni and Syrian children are allowed access to public 
schools as per an administrative order of 2018 75 (and before which: a Presidential 
Decree in 201276). This order is being renewed every year and it allows aforementioned 
access without imposing additional fees on Yemenis and Syrians (unlike the decree no. 
284/2014). 
Other than the aforementioned nationalities, refugees are not allowed to enroll their 
children to public schools. The alternatives are limited to homeschooling, private schools 
that often require prohibitive admission fees77, and community schools that are not 
accredited by the Ministry of Education. Article 58 of Law 39/198178 states that owners of 
private schools must be Egyptian nationals. For this reason, many schools who are 
owned by persons from the same nationalities as the refugee communities are not 
accredited in Egypt. Consequently, children who graduate from these schools are not 
allowed to pursue higher education in Egypt.79 
While UNHCR exerts advocacy efforts with the government to allow refugee children of 
all nationalities access public schools, other organizations focus on improving the 
education provided to certain nationalities. Plan International works on enhancing Syrian 
learning centers that most refugee students attend (in parallel to public schools).80  
The concept behind these learning centers is to help Syrians avoid the hardships they 
face in public schools (explained in subsequent sections). As an alternative, Syrian 
students attend four times a week in these centers, and once a week in public schools 
(the minimum number of days they need to attend in order to be allowed to sit for final 
exams).81  
 
72 Ministry of Education Decree No. 284 of 2014 (concerning the Rules of Incoming Students to Egyptian 
Universities, Scholarships for Incoming Students, and Egyptian Students Studying in Egyptian Schools 
Abroad), The Official Gazette, 7 July 2014 (Egypt) [hereinafter Decree No. 284/2014]. 
73 WESAL AFIFI, FIELD REPORT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFUGEE 
CHILDREN IN EGYPT 10 (2003), http://schools.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/cmrs/reports/Documents/wesal.pdf. 
74 CMRS Report, supra note 8, at 144. 
75 Signed Administrative Order on Treating Syrian and Yemini Students as Egyptian for the Year 2018/2019. 
76 UNHCR EGYPT 3RP REGIONAL REFUGEE AND RESILIENCE PLAN 2017-2018 4, https://www.unhcr.org/eg/wp-
content/uploads/sites/36/2019/05/3RP_2017_2018_EN.pdf. 
77 CMRS Report, supra note 8, at 147. 
78 Law No. 139 of 1981 (Promulgating Education Law), The Official Gazette, 20 August 1981 (Egypt) 
[hereinafter Law No. 139/1981]. 
79 CMRS Report, supra note 8, at 147. 
80 Id. at 150. 
81 Id. at 151. 
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Academics such as Katarzyna Grabska and Tarek Badawy argue that Egypt is breaching 
an international obligation, its obligation as per Article 28(1)(a) of the CRC, by not 
allowing refugee children of all nationalities to primary public schools.828384 Amira Hetaba 
et al. agree with the aforementioned view, and adds that Egypt is also breaching its 
obligation as per Article 13 of ICESCR.85 
 
D. Access to Healthcare  
As for Egypt’s international obligations to allow access to healthcare to refugees, Article 
12(1) of ICESCR provides “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health.” Moreover, ILO Convention of 1962 
No. 118 on Equality of Treatment (Social Security) to which Egypt is a party provides as 
per Article 2(1)(a) non-nationals the right to medical care on a par with nationals. There 
is a general requirement of reciprocity provided by the Convention, but refugees are 
exempted from it as per Article 10(1). 
There exist bilateral agreements as well, such as the Protocol in the Area of Health and 
Drugs between the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Palestine 
of 1996. According to the Protocol, Egypt is committed to treat difficult cases from 
Palestine in Egyptian hospitals. However, the status of its implementation of the Protocol 
is unclear. The mechanism is also unknown, that is, whether Palestinian patients should 
approach hospitals directly or whether the two governments have to agree on those 
cases before.86 
Domestically, a glimpse of hope exists in the fact that Egypt’s policy regarding healthcare 
facilities is to allow all refugees access. They are entitled to primary, secondary, and 
 
82 Tarek Badawy, Comments on Egypt’s Report to the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (April 2007), available at: 
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/docs/tarek_badawy.doc. 
83 KATARZYNA GRABSKA, WHO ASKED THEM ANYWAY?: RIGHTS, POLICIES AND WELLBEING OF REFUGEES IN EGYPT 
(2006), 
http://aucegypt.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwY2AwNtIz0EUrE8yS05KNk1IskwyNk0
2TDA3N0oxSDZItjVJTgNVTinka_FIF0DmfiDOTMG_kgo1cGAPbHcbAopfZxAjU5TJ3DQcdsQxVilRDuAkysI
B2DQgxMKXmiTCIhWfkKyQWZ6emKIAORVUAZrjyxEp7UQZFN9cQZw9dmAnx0MGTeJhNlkZiDCzADnmq
BIOCSYqBZWKauVFaIrC9Y2iRmJRqmGYCbJcDVVlamCWaSTJI4TZHCp-
kNAMXoosvw8CaBkyCqbIIj8mBfQoAF-xf9A. 
84 El Guindy, supra note 13. 
85 CMRS Report, supra note 8, at 145. 
86 Id. at 170. 
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emergency healthcare on an equal level to Egyptian nationals; a policy which has always 
been praised by UNHCR.87 
However, there exists a number of practical problems on the ground. First, refugees face 
the same issues as Egyptians with regards to the crowdedness and the poor quality of 
medical services at public health facilities.88 Refugees have reported in focus groups 
conducted by CMRS that they have approached public healthcare facilities seeking 
urgent medical services, but there were no beds available at the time.89 
A research conducted by CMRS indicated that many refugees who were interviewed for 
the purposes of the research did not know that they are allowed access to public 
healthcare.90 This could be due to what the authors of the report describe as the 
fragmentation of the provision of healthcare services. These services are provided by 
public health facilities (including certain hospitals with low cost for refugees such as 
Mustafa Mahmoud) and different NGO and INGO service providers.91 Refugees 
interviewed demonstrated a lack of knowledge on the process they need to go through in 
order to obtain free or subsidized healthcare services, therefore, they resort to private 
and expensive alternatives. The report reveals that Syrian households included in the 
study spend an average of 735 EGP a month on healthcare.92 
Moreover, Hetaba et al. point out another issue faced by refugees, which is the lack of 
healthcare providers’ awareness of refugees’ right to access public health facilities on an 
equal level as nationals. As a result, some refugees may face discrimination to that 
end.93 However, the CMRS report does praise Egypt for its successful efforts with 
regards to medical treatment of the newborn. Each newborn in Egypt receives a health 
card by which he or she can have free vaccinations and medical care regardless of his or 
her nationality.94 
And in the same exemplary manner, Egypt provides medical services to refugee 
newborn children. Hetaba et al. call to extend the scope of public health campaigns in 
Egypt, such as the recent screening campaign for Hepatitis C, to include refugees. They 
argue that the latter campaign has been focused on nationals, although there are no 
 
87 UNHCR, supra note 4, at 3. 
88 CMRS Report, supra note 8, at 183 and 185. 
89 Id. at 185. 
90 Id. at 183. 
91 Id. at 188. 
92 Id. at 183. 
93 Id. at 183. 
94 Id. at 187. 
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provisions explicitly restricting foreigners from taking benefit of it.95 They also 
recommend that healthcare services are to be provided to refugees through clearly 
identified institutions in order to address the issue of fragmentation. Furthermore, 
awareness should be raised among refugees of the steps needed to seek medical 
care.96  
Lastly, it is important to mention that UNHCR is trying to compensate for the gaps in the 
healthcare system by conducting capacity building activities at public health facilities. It 
also provides through partners psychosocial and mental health support to refugees, as 
well as follow-up on the ones with chronic diseases and referral care for some cases.97 
 
E. Bureaucratic Challenges 
There exist bureaucratic obstacles; most of which are not addressed by academic 
papers, but rather by UNHCR reports and news sites. An example of these challenges is 
the process by which refugees obtain residency permits. According to UNHCR, the 
process is lengthy, and the permit is only valid for six months (a relatively short period in 
light of the difficulties of its issuance process).98 99 
It even has become more complicated, as a residency permit digital card has been 
introduced in October 2019 to replace the residency stickers fixed on UNHCR cards. Yet, 
the 100 EGP renewal fees of the card remain above 100% more expensive than the old 
sticker renewal fees. According to the government, the new digital cards may allow 
refugees to access some social services. There has been no clarification so far of the 
nature of those anticipated services.100 
On a related note, a residency is essential for admission in public schools (for refugee 
children of so -called “privileged” nationalities). It has been reported that there are cases 
where some schools require the residency to be issued on a passport which complicates 
the process even further. 
 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 188. 
97 UNHCR, supra note 4, at 4. 
98 El Guindy, supra note 6. 
99 UNHCR, supra note 4, at 2. 
100 Sama Osama, Egypt issues new permit residence cards for refugees and asylum-seekers, AHRAM 
ONLINE (October 28, 2019), available at: 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/354842/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-issues-new-permit-residence-
cards-for-refuge.aspx. 
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One more bureaucratic challenge that faces parents of refugee children during the 
admission process is the requirement to provide the last school certificate that is less 
than two years old. If the certificate is not available/is more than two years old, students 
are required to sit an exam at the Ministry of Education. 101 102 
 
F. Discourse on Egypt’s Policies 
In this section, I will put forward the views of several academics and publicists on Egypt’s 
policies. I will focus on the following subjects: the unequal treatment of refugees 
according to their nationalities, the impact of politics on refugees’ rights in Egypt, and the 
criticism of the MoU between UNHCR and the government of Egypt and the RSD 
system. 
 
1. Unequal Treatment of Refugees According to Their Nationalities in Egypt 
In addition to the fact that only certain nationalities are allowed access to public schools 
as per the law (leaving children from sub-Saharan African countries with no access to 
formal education), several scholars have tackled the issue of the unequal treatment from 
different angles.  
Rochelle Davis points out that Somalis, Eritreans, and Ethiopians generally do not enjoy 
any privileged status by the Egyptian government and that they completely rely on 
services that are provided by UNHCR and other NGOs. She also brings the example of 
Iraqis not being allowed to create community organizations like Syrians. This shuts the 
door for possible alternative services that could have helped destitute Iraqi refugee 
families.103 
However, it is important to note that even a “privileged” status that is given to a few 
nationalities of refugees could be tricky. For example, refugee children who have access 
to public schools, such as Syrians, report serious problems that are not properly 
addressed. The problems include bullying that they face in public schools on the basis of 
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their nationality, in addition to common problems that even citizen children suffer from, 
like overcrowded classrooms and the lack of transportation to schools.104 
 
2. Politics Influencing the Rights of Refugees in Egypt 
On another note, Rochelle Davis argues that politics affect the manner the Egyptian 
government treats different categories of refugees. Requirements are increasingly being 
made for entry of asylum-seeking persons to Egypt. For example, Syrians could enter 
the country before with no need for a visa. After the political changes that ensued Morsi’s 
removal from Office in summer 2013, restrictions have been made requiring Syrians to 
have a visa and to finish a security clearance procedure. Aside from the fact that this 
process is time-consuming, it is also an expensive one, costing thousands of dollars per 
person for it to be duly finished.105 
According to Davis, different political events repeatedly affected how refugees were 
treated by the state over the past decades. To name an example, Egypt’s deteriorating 
relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have scaled down the rights 
Palestinians are provided in Egypt. It reportedly started with the assassination of Egypt’s 
Minister of Culture in 1978 by a Palestinian splinter group. Then, it was further worsened 
by the coming into force of the Camp David Accords. A gradual restriction of rights of 
Palestinians has continued to take place. As a result, Palestinians today do not have free 
access to public education. Furthermore, they are no longer entitled to own property, and 
their right to work has been scaled down.106   
Another similar event that negatively affected refugees was the time where an attempt to 
assassinate Hosni Mubarak took place in Addis Ababa in 1995 by Islamic militants. 
Ethiopia accused Khartoum of being involved in this attack. As a result, Egypt revoked 
Wadi Al-Nil agreement with Sudan. Consequently, the living conditions of the Sudanese 
populations living in Egypt significantly deteriorated.107  
Later on, the 2004 Four Freedoms agreement mentioned in earlier sections of this 
research has supposedly increased the rights provided to Sudanese persons in Egypt. 
However, it was reported that, in practice, Sudanese refugees face random deportations 
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and difficulties in accessing employment. This is an example of how a so-called 
“exceptional status” could be tricky.108   
On a related note, Tarek Badawy partially blames UNHCR for the situation. He says that 
had UNHCR stopped assisting Sudanese refugees once the Four Freedoms agreement 
came into force, the Egyptian state would have found itself compelled to fulfill its 
commitments towards them. This type of over-mandatory practice by UNHCR is what 
Badawy calls “negative responsibility”, as it eventually works against the interests of 
UNHCR’s people of concern.109110  
 
3. Criticism of the MoU and the RSD System in Egypt 
In addition to the aforementioned points, Badawy criticizes the MoU signed in 1954 for 
being outdated, vague-worded, and with negative implications in the present on UNHCR 
work. Although one could easily fall prey into believing that the reservations to the 
Refugee Convention constitute the most difficult challenge that comes in the way of 
integration of refugees in Egypt, it is not the case. By looking into the MoU that Egypt 
signed decades ago, we see that the absence of integration as a durable solution has 
been rooted in Egypt’s stance since 1954.  
As pointed out by Badawy, local integration is not added to the durable solutions 
mentioned in Articles 2(b) and (c). The articles go as follows: 
“b) Facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees;  
c) Encourage, in cooperation with the Egyptian Government, and the international 
organizations competent in immigration matters, the initiative leading to resettle, in every 
possible measure, in the countries of immigration, the refugees residing in Egypt;”  
Tarek Badawy argues that the fact that Egypt neglects the integration durable solution is 
itself a breach to its international commitments. Although Egypt has made reservations to 
some of the provisions of the 1951 Convention, it has accepted other provisions that 
implied that integration is one of the durable solutions for refugees. By assuming that 
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integration is not a valid option for refugees, Egypt would be breaching its obligation to 
abide by the Refugee Convention it has acceded to.111112 
To mention other aspects of Badawy’s criticism of the MoU: he criticizes the fact that 
UNHCR is obliged, according to the MoU, to provide Egypt with information on refugees 
in Egypt, while it is Egypt that is supposed to provide UNHCR with such information 
according to the Refugee Convention. Other academics, such as Rochelle Davis, agree 
with Badawy that the MoU provisions are no longer relevant.113 
On another note, Badawy criticizes the current asylum system in Egypt for the fact that 
UNHCR solely conducts the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process by which 
asylum-seekers are given the refugee status under international law. According to 
UNHCR, RSD is primarily the states’ responsibility. In some cases, UNHCR steps in to 
conduct RSD on behalf of states. (The reason could be that the state is not a party to the 
1951 Convention, or that it does not have an appropriate national asylum system in 
place).114 Some countries conduct RSD jointly with UNHCR pending the establishment of 
an efficient national system. Badawy refers to the system in Turkey as an example of 
these countries where hybrid systems exist. While the Turkish government processes 
asylum requests of European nationals only, UNHCR processes requests of non-
Europeans (subject to resettlement to a third country within six months as a condition). 
Nevertheless, this is not the case for Egypt, as all asylum requests are handled by 
UNHCR. 
Badawy argues that UNHCR Egypt should have seized the opportunity of potential state 
cooperation when an RSD committee was created under the MFA in 1984. According to 
observers, no follow-up on that initiative has been made; it has since fallen into 
obscurity.115 Badawy says that the organization should have entirely handed over the 
RSD work to the newly-created committee.   
As for the current state of affairs, Badawy suggests that a hybrid system could be 
introduced where the UNHCR keeps conducting RSD requests, while the Egyptian 
government would process RSD appeals. This system would be in the best interest of 
refugees for a couple of reasons. First, it will take a financial burden off UNHCR so it 
could focus on its original mandate, that is, lobbying for the protection of refugees. As 
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mentioned in an interview with UNHCR Assistant Regional Representative, Vincent 
Cochetel: "This office was not meant to be what it is. UNHCR has been working in Egypt 
on RSD procedure since 1954. It is filling a vacuum, determining status for the 
government by default because the authorities are not ready to assume responsibility. It 
is not natural for UNHCR to get involved in this field."116  
The second reason why a hybrid system would be useful is because it allows asylum 
seekers to appeal to their RSD at a separate body than the one that initially conducted 
it.117 
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III. Refugee Administration Models in Jordan and Uganda 
For the purposes of this comparative study, I have examined the sources available on 
refugee policies in two countries, Jordan and Uganda. Both countries are comparable to 
Egypt in several aspects. The reasons for which I have included both countries in my 
research is already mentioned in the Methodology section.  
 
A. Jordan’s Refugee Administration Model 
Like Egypt, Jordan is considered a transit country for refugees. It is the country with the 
second largest share of refugees per capita, hosting 745,192 refugees as per UNHCR 
Latest Factsheet (November 2019). Around 88% of this figure are Syrian refugees.118 
The majority of refugees in Jordan live in urban settings alongside nationals rather than 
camps and are expected by humanitarian experts to stay for decades.119 
 
1. Legal and Institutional Framework Governing the Matters of Refugees in Jordan 
Unlike Egypt, Jordan is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Yet, it signed in 
1998 an MoU with UNHCR that states that refugees can stay in Jordan for six months 
after recognition, given that UNHCR will find a country to be resettled in.120 Also, it is 
obliged to abide by the Arab Charter on Human Rights of 2004 that grants several 
freedoms, such as freedom of belief, education, movement and access to courts. In 
addition, Jordan must, as a member state of the Arab League, grant asylum for those 
who are forced to leave their country due to a threat on life, political opinions, their 
religion, or their ethnicities. 121  
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2. Registration of New Arrivals  
The two entities that work on refugee administration in Jordan are the government of 
Jordan, and the UNHCR office.  
On one hand, the Ministry of Interior ensures national security by performing the early 
registration process that involves interviews and a biometric scan. It grants a service 
card to refugees upon registration that would allow them to live outside camps and 
access education and healthcare.122 
Meanwhile, the Planning and International Cooperation Ministry coordinates with NGOs 
their proposed plans and refers them to the concerned ministries.  
As for UNHCR, it mainly works on finding a third country for resettlement as per the MoU, 
conducts RSD along with the state, and protects refugees against gender-based 
violence, exploitation, and trafficking. It also protects refugees against refoulement by 
verifying the reasons of return and collaborates with other UN entities such as the 
WFP.123 
 
3. Right to Work 
Theoretically, Syrian refugees are allowed and encouraged to work in Jordan since the 
signing of an agreement called the Jordan Compact in 2016 (will be elaborated in further 
sections; it is important also to mention that the Compact extends to Syrian refugees 
only).  
However, work of all refugees, whether Syrians or non-Syrians, is prohibited unless they 
obtain a work permit, which is almost an impossible task due to a number of reasons. 
First, it is a costly procedure that only a little fragment of refugee households can afford. 
Even those who could afford applying to work permits might not do so due to their lack of 
knowledge on the process and/or general mistrust of governmental entities. In addition, 
the law requires refugees to have a Jordanian sponsor, sometimes named a ‘guarantor’; 
a procedure informal employers who hire refugees tend to avoid. Formalizing employees 
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adds financial costs to the employers, such as the amount they must pay for social 
security, therefore, a large number of employers prefer to lean on informal labor.124 
There also exists the challenge that most of the jobs refugees manage to land are low-
paying factory jobs.125 Some of the Syrian refugees who are college-educated land jobs 
that do not align with their skill sets and level of education. While this might be the case 
for many Jordanian college graduates, refugees’ chances of landing jobs that match their 
qualifications are even less. According to an ILO report, 17 sectors are closed before 
foreigners in Jordan, including: engineering, telecommunication, accounting, sales, 
clerical and administrative jobs.126 
 
4. Right to Education 
Despite Jordan’s non-restrictive policies with regards to access to school education, a 
large number of refugee children remain out of school for a number of reasons. These 
include the financial burden of transportation costs and school supplies that low-income 
refugee families might not afford. 
In an attempt to provide school education for all refugee children without overcrowding 
public schools, Jordan established a double-shift system at schools where Jordanian 
children mostly attend school in the morning, and Syrian children mostly attend the 
afternoon shift. As indicated by Veronique Barbelet et al., the system caused a number 
of problems. First, some families were reluctant to send their female children to the 
afternoon shift as it gets dark. Secondly, the quality of education is generally perceived to 
be lower in the afternoon shift. Furthermore, it is easier in the afternoon shifts for children 
to be identified as Syrians, which exposes them to harassment. Eventually, many 
children in the secondary stage drop out. On one hand, they suffer from bullying. On the 
other hand, they need to work in order to contribute to their family incomes.127  
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5. Access to Healthcare 
Access to public healthcare at the Ministry of Health facilities is not free for refugees in 
Jordan. Some nationalities have access at a highly subsidized rate, while others have to 
pay full foreigners’ rate. However, emergency, maternity and childcare health services 
are free-of-charge for some nationalities given that certain requirements are met.128 
Further explanation will be put forward in the ‘Unequal Treatment’ section. 
 
6. Discourse on Jordan’s Policies 
Jordan has had recent influxes of refugees since the Syrian crisis in 2012,129 which made 
popular the study of its refugee policies among researchers in recent years. Several 
publicists have criticized those policies for different reasons. The main three accusations 
present in the literature are: 1. Jordan’s refugee policies are heavily influenced by 
politics; 2. The claim that Jordan is using its refugee policies to lobby for additional 
international aid; and, 3. the unequal treatment of refugees according to their 
nationalities in Jordan. I will present below the narratives of those authors. 
 
a. Politics Influencing the Rights of Refugees in Jordan 
According to Victoria Kelberer, author of Negotiating Crisis: International Aid and 
Refugee Policy in Jordan, the unwelcoming attitude towards refugees all started in the 
late 1960’s when Palestinians refugee camps became enclaves for Palestinian 
nationalism, and mini-states of a sort. She argues that the bloody confrontations between 
Palestinian militias and Jordanian forces in 1970 (known as Black September) might 
have inspired a closed-door policy towards refugees for many years. 
Decades after this conflict, large numbers of Iraqis fled to Jordan in the aftermath of the 
Gulf War in 1991. Jordan was already impacted by the Palestinian camps experience, 
therefore it insisted to label Iraqi refugees as “guests” rather than “refugees”. It allowed 
them to stay in urban settings, because: 1. it wanted to avoid the Palestinian camps 
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scenario; and, 2. because it wanted the economy to take benefit from the presence of the 
relatively wealthy Iraqis. 
As a result of the influx of Iraqis, the international scene in Jordan has changed. UNRWA 
used to be the operating refugee agency in the country as it served the Palestinian 
population. A few years after the Gulf war, UNHCR established its office in 1997 and 
signed an MoU with the Jordanian government in 1998. Since that time, Jordan has sat 
on the Executive Committee of UNHCR and has played an important role in shaping its 
policies (although it is not even a signatory to the 1951 Convention).130 
The second influx of Iraqi refugees took place a decade after. When the US invaded Iraq 
in 2003, the international community anticipated a new influx of Iraqis fleeing their 
country. According to the authors of Hosting Guests, Creating Citizens: Models of 
Refugee Administration in Jordan and Egypt only a small community of Iraqi officials and 
their families fled at that time. Two years after, when the sectarian conflict began in 2005, 
large influxes of Iraqis fled to Jordan. At that time, the international community was not 
prepared.131 
According to Kelberer, Jordan has first been welcoming of the Iraqi “guests”, allowing 
them access to public schools, as well as applying a laissez-faire policy with regards to 
their contributing to the economy. Effectively, it allowed their access to the informal labor 
market as well as having their own businesses. The turning point was the 2005 bombing 
of hotels in Amman, reportedly committed by Iraqis. After then, the government started 
restricting their access to public schools and to crack down on their businesses. The 
situation kept deteriorating until UNHCR transferred directly to the government more than 
half of 2007 budget. Only then, the tightened policies started to relax. Kelberer argues 
that this is a clear example of how Jordan has used its refugee policies to receive direct 
aid from the international community. 
In the beginning of the Syrian crisis, refugees did not need a visa. An open-door policy 
operated until 2013 as the arrival rates started to grow in the latter half of 2012 through 
2013 (it has been reported that the number of new arrivals reached 3000 refugees per 
day at some point).132133 Over the course of 2012 to 2014, Jordan opened two refugee 
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camps to accommodate large numbers of Syrians, especially the new arrivals. However, 
the majority of refugees lived in urban settings as mentioned earlier.  
The government then limited the number of new arrivals by restricting the unofficial 
crossing and created a procedure in 2013 by which the refugees stayed in camps unless 
they are sponsored by a Jordanian household with a direct kinship. Afterwards, a 
bombing took place at a border crossing that led to the killing of state officials. As a 
consequence, Jordan closed its northern border at the time.134 
Nevertheless, Jordan has allowed Syrians to access healthcare facilities and to attend 
public schools; a decision that came as surprising to observers. However, the Kelberer 
argues that the decision comes as a part of Jordan’s broader tendency of using its 
refugee policies to lobby for additional direct aid. The author brings the example of the 
$150 million loan approved by the World Bank for its bread subsidy program; although 
the World Bank policy is not in favor of subsidies.135 
Another aspect of the government’s concerns was the deteriorating services provided to 
Jordanian citizens. Kelberer reports that areas with a high refugee population suffered 
degraded infrastructure and overstretched services that barely met the basic needs of 
impoverished Jordanians as well as migrant workers and refugees. In 2014, however, 
the government announced that it no longer provided free healthcare to Syrian refugees, 
who would have to pay fees to have access equal to those paid by uninsured 
Jordanians.136 
b. Jordan’s Lobbying for International Aid: the Jordan’s Compact 
Rochelle Davis et al. argue that the concern of the impact of refugees on Jordan as a 
host country has been used by Jordan in international conferences to provide investment 
opportunities for Jordan; the EU is increasingly willing to provide grants and benefits to 
host countries in the global south. As thousands of refugees died on their journey to 
Europe over the course of 2015, new migration policies had to be placed by the EU.137 
Rochelle Davis et al. bring the example of a document Jordan presented to the 
international community in the London Syria Conference in 2016 titled the Jordan 
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Compact.138 Jordan clearly stated that the Compact aims to turn the refugee crisis to a 
development opportunity for both nationals and refugees.139 
The Jordan Compact is a new holistic approach signed in February 2016 between 
Jordan, and various humanitarian and development actors, including the UK, Germany, 
Norway, Kuwait, and the United Nations. It deals with protracted displacement, namely 
the Syrian Refugee Crisis.140 It calls for a “development” plan to alleviate the impact of 
influxes of refugees and opens up the EU market to Jordan.141 
(Remark: the Jordan Compact is limited to Syrian refugees only; it does not include non-
Syrian refugees. Further elaboration is included in the ‘Unequal Treatment’ section.)  
According to the Compact, Jordan is committed to providing school education to all 
Syrian refugee children. Furthermore, grants and loans would be paid to Jordan and 
relaxed EU trade regulations would be in force. Payment of grants and loans is linked to 
the achievement of certain targets/milestones, such as Jordan’s issuance of 200,000 
work permits in certain sectors. On the other hand, facilitated trade regulations with the 
EU are to be applied with Jordan’s businesses given that these businesses employ 
certain quotas of Syrian refugees. Moreover, Jordan is committed to formalizing Syrian 
businesses. 
Refugee Compacts are new policy models for host countries neighboring conflicts to deal 
with refugee crises. The example of Jordan Compact is followed/to be followed by 
several countries including Turkey, Lebanon and Ethiopia. Veronique Barbelet et al. think 
that future approaches in Jordan and other countries should aim to include the 
perspectives of refugees and try to be realistic in terms of the expected achievements. 
For that reason, they produced a policy brief to analyze the outcomes of the Compact. 
The policy brief was published in 2018 by Overseas Development Institute (ODI), a UK 
think tank on international development and humanitarian issues. 142 
While the authors acknowledge that the Jordan Compact has increased the number of 
Syrian refugee children enrolled in schools as well as refugees in the formal labor 
market, they argue that it had several drawbacks. On one hand, two studies conducted in 
2016 and 2017 by Bellamy et al. and Hagen-Zanker et al. concluded that the daily lives 
of refugees in Syria did not improve quickly after the application of the Compact. It has 
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been argued that the views of refugees have not been taken into consideration in the 
design of the Compact. Veronique Barbelet et al argue that the negotiations of the 
Compact were not inclusive as it mainly included representatives of the governments of 
Jordan and the UK as well as the World Bank. There were no actors bringing in refugee 
perspectives. For example, UNHCR has only been consulted in the final stages. 
Moreover, civil society, private sector, and trade unions were not included in the 
negotiating process. As a counter-argument, it has been said that the choice of 
negotiators had to be politically pragmatic or else the Compact would not be issued, 
especially in the sensitive context of a country in the Middle East with a high 
unemployment rate among its nationals. 143  
With regards to work opportunities provided to refugees, the number of work permits 
provided to refugees before the Compact used to be drastically low; around 3,000 work 
permits. Over the course of one year and eight months after the Compact signing, 
71,000 permits had been issued for Syrian refugees as the government has established 
several procedures to facilitate the issuance of work permits. For example, it has set 
‘grace periods’ where application fees of work permits would be waived for Syrian 
refugees. So far it has set nine periods; the latest one will end in December 2020.144 In 
addition, cooperatives could now apply for work permits on behalf of Syrian refugee 
workers in the agriculture fees. This has led to a big increase in the number of permits in 
that field, as these permits allow agricultural workers to change employers as per the 
seasonal labor demand without having to apply for a new permit. 145 
Furthermore, the Compact assigns refugees jobs in Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 
which has contributed to the considerable increase in the number of issued permits. 
However, the ILO reports that some Syrian refugees are reluctant to work in SEZs for a 
number of reasons, including the poor income (compared to the informal sector) and the 
fact that they are at a large distance from where refugees live with weak transportation 
means.146   
Despite the increasing number of work permits issued, the majority of Syrian refugees 
remain in informal jobs. According to an ILO report, only one eighth of the adult refugee 
population are working in the formal labor sector. In addition, the challenges elaborated 
earlier remain to exist, such as the bureaucratic challenges and the reluctance of 
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employers to pose as ‘guarantors’ of their refugee employees. Furthermore, the access 
ensured by the Compact to refugees has been limited to a few sectors of industry. Self-
employment is not allowed either.147 A similar concern is reported by other researchers 
who argue that the Compact has produced ‘mixed results’, as only a minority of refugees 
are involved in well-paying construction jobs.148 
The Compact did not improve the working conditions of most Syrian female refugees. 
The majority of female refugees work in or close to their homes due to social constraints; 
for example, as caterers, sewers, or cleaners. The Compact does not cover self-
employment, therefore these informal workers neither are included in social security nor 
do they receive support. Veronique Barbelet et al. recommend that labor law should 
regulate different forms of self-employment. They also suggest that policy makers would 
address issues that hinder female refugees from seeking employment outside of their 
homes, such as harassment in public spaces.149 
One more problem that faces refugees is the lack of knowledge on the process of 
applying for work permits and the fear that they would be unnecessarily identified in the 
eyes of the government. The authors recommend better communication on the process 
to be carried out by organizations dealing with refugees as well as influential community 
leaders, especially in faith-based circles.150 
As a result of the fact that refugee perspectives were not included in the designing stage 
of the Compact, government priorities were put first. This is reflected in the indicator 
measuring the success of the Compact, which is the number of permits issued. Instead, 
Veronique Barbelet et al. suggest using as an indicator the number of refugee 
households that ceased to be under the poverty line, and other indicators, which would 
truly reveal the economic situation of those households151152. They suggest that refugee 
voices are to be included in the assessment of the Compact through conducting 
perception surveys.153 
On another note, it is true that the numbers of refugee children enrolled in school have 
increased. However, large numbers of refugee children are still out of school for a 
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number of reasons including financial burdens and the poor quality of education. A large 
number of refugee children attend only part-time. Also, the Compact states that around a 
hundred double-shift schools shall be established. It is necessary to take into 
consideration the challenges produced by the double-shift system in order to establish 
the proper measures. To bring an example of such measures, Veronique Barbelet et al. 
suggest that refugee children who live away from school should be allowed to attend the 
morning shift.  
 
c. Unequal Treatment of Refugees According to Their Nationalities in Jordan 
Non-Syrian refugees are largely excluded from humanitarian programs that target 
Syrians. On the level of assistance provided by the UN, non-Syrian refugees who lie 
under the vulnerability threshold receive less total assistance than Syrian refugees in the 
same conditions. This is due to the fact that Syrian-refugees receive WFP food vouchers 
as well as child cash grants by UNICEF, in addition to the monthly cash assistance by 
UNHCR. Vulnerable non-Syrian refugees, on the other hand, receive only the cash 
assistance from UNHCR. As for non-Syrian refugees who lie just above the vulnerability 
threshold, they still receive less total assistance than Syrian refugees who are at the 
same economic level.  
On the level of NGOs, non-Syrian refugees are often excluded from assistance programs 
provided by these organizations. Even the NGO programs that include non-Syrians as 
beneficiaries, only a little fraction of the total amount of their beneficiaries. This could be 
due to the fact that the non-Syrian refugees are often invisible and out of radar for these 
organizations.154 
This situation extends to governmental approaches as well, such as the Jordan 
Compact. Although the Compact has been seen as a vital and a progressive step 
towards improving the lives of refugees in Jordan, its scope is only limited to Syrian 
refugees. Iraqi, Sudanese, and other nationalities refugees cannot obtain work permits 
under the Compact in the same manner Syrian refugees do. Moreover, informal workers 
who are non-Syrian refugees who get prosecuted for not having a work permit shall be 
subject to penalties, unlike Syrian refugees who would get exempted of penalties upon 
their retroactive applying to a work permit.155 
 
154 ON THE BASIS OF NATIONALITY, supra note 128. 
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This unequal treatment could be attributed to the lack of a strong international lobby 
pushing for the rights of non-Syrian refugees in Jordan,156157 unlike the case for Syrian 
refugee crisis. Reports by Refugees International (RI) and Mennonite Central Committee 
(MCC) recommend that the government include non-Syrian refugees in the Compact 
flexible regulations with regards to work permits.158159 However, the most prominent 
aspect of unequal treatment lies in the fact that refugees have different access levels to 
healthcare based on their nationalities. 
As for Syrians, they were initially allowed in Ministry of Health facilities for free healthcare 
services. Then, starting November 2014, they had to pay a subsidized rate which is 
equivalent to that of uninsured Jordanians, namely 35-60% lower than the foreigners’ 
rate. As of February 2018, the government decided that Syrians will pay 80% of the 
foreigners’ rate, which has led to financial hardships for Syrian refugees needing 
healthcare. Later in April 2019, the government revoked the decision. Therefore, Syrian 
refugees are now allowed in public healthcare facilities on the same level as uninsured 
Jordanians. Moreover, Syrian refugees are allowed free-of-charge maternity and 
childcare health services. The World Bank continues to support the government in order 
to keep providing these subsidies.160  
The problem is that this treatment does not extend to non-Syrian refugees. As for the 
Iraqi refugees, they used to access healthcare services at the rate of uninsured 
Jordanians until mid-2015. Then the government decided that they would pay full 
foreigners’ rate. Once again, the government took back the decision in 2017 and allowed 
Iraqi refugees with residency permits to access healthcare at previous rates. However, 
not all Iraqis meet the requirement of having a valid residency permit.161 As for refugees 
who are non-Syrians and non-Iraqis, they have always had to pay foreigners’ rates in 
governmental hospitals.162 The only exception is the fact that children of all nationalities 
receive free vaccinations at public health facilities until the age of five.163  
 
156 Rochelle Johnston et al., Realizing the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Jordan from 
Countries Other than Syria, 3 (Apr. 2019), available at: 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/71975. 
157 ON THE BASIS OF NATIONALITY, supra note 128, at 4-6. 
158 Id. 
159 Izza Leghtas, Out of Reach: Legal Work Still Inaccessible to Refugees in Jordan (Sept. 2018), available 
at: https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2018/9/10/out-of-reach-legal-work-still-inaccessible-to-
refugees-in-jordan.  
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161 Id. at 18. 
162 UNHCR JORDAN FACT SHEET (Apr. 2019), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/69370. 
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Even access to emergency healthcare for non-Syrians is charged. While it is sufficient for 
Syrian refugees to present valid UNHCR cards as well as their Ministry of Interior ID to 
access free emergency healthcare, non-Syrian refugees are charged for it. 164 
In an attempt to fill the gaps, UNHCR provides in their clinics a few healthcare services 
that are free of charge for all non-Syrian refugees (whether those who live in the camps 
or in urban settings).165 However, a study by UNHCR reveals that only 66% of non-
Syrian refugees (among study interviewees) are aware of the free healthcare provided by 
UNHCR. Among those who are aware of the existence of the services, only 51% know 
the location of their nearest UNHCR clinic.166 In addition, the limited number of clinics 
make it difficult for healthcare staff to serve all the patients showing up on the same day. 
Furthermore, UNHCR covers only a small number of high cost tertiary services. For the 
non-Syrians who are registered at UNHCR but have not yet obtained their refugee 
status, UNHCR only covers emergency high-cost interventions. 167 
On another note, Rochelle Davis et al. elaborate on the unequal treatment of refugees 
according to their nationalities and deem it comparable to the situation in Egypt. For 
example, the Sudanese and Somali refugees, who arrived in Jordan through complicated 
journeys, are not allowed to access services by the government or UNHCR while their 
cases are viewed by UNHCR.  
Another example of unequal treatment that is brought by the authors is Jordan’s policy of 
not allowing in/providing governmental services to Palestinians fleeing Syria, although 
they flee as a result of the same crisis other Syrian refugees escape from. 168
B. Uganda’s Refugee Administration Model 
As per UNHCR factsheet dated January 2020, Uganda, the country with the third largest 
refugee population around the world, hosts around 1.394 million refugees; almost 62% of 
which are South Sudanese refugees. It has been known in the media for being the most 
 
164 ON THE BASIS OF NATIONALITY, supra note 128, at: 18-19. 
165 UNHCR, supra note 118.  
166 UNHCR, HEALTH ACCESS AND UTILIZATION SURVEY 19 (Dec. 2017), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR-
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refugee-friendly country in the world as it has maintained an open border policy and has 
always allowed refugees to stay in the country for as long as they want.169170171  
Around 92% of refugees in Uganda live in settlements in West Nile (a sub-region in 
northern Uganda)172. In this region, refugees are given plots of land for farming and 
housing as will be explained in subsequent sections.173 Only 8% of refugees live in urban 
settings including Kampala, the Capital.174 
The history of Uganda as a host country to refugees dates back to the Second World 
War, where it hosted thousands of Europeans who have been displaced. In the decades 
after, it has hosted refugees fleeing neighboring countries due to armed conflicts, wars of 
independence, and natural disasters.175   
 
1. Legal and Institutional Framework Governing the Matters of Refugees in Uganda 
Like Egypt, Uganda is a State Party to the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and the 
OAU Convention that adopts a broader definition of refugees. Locally, the matters of 
refugees are governed by a domestic law called the Refugee Act of 2006 and a 
complementary set of regulations called the Refugee Regulations of 2010. 
The law has been seen as protection-oriented, and in harmony with the aforementioned 
conventions. While the law is progressive in total, some of its provisions have been 
criticized by academics. I will start by listing all aspects of it, including progressive ones, 
then I will put forward the criticizing discourse. 
 
 
 
169 Sulaiman Momodu, Uganda stands out in refugees hospitality (Dec. 2018 - March 2019), available at: 
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/uganda-stands-out-refugees-
hospitality. 
170 Joseph Goldstein, As Rich Nations Close the Door on Refugees, Uganda Welcomes Them, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Oct. 28, 2018), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/world/africa/uganda-refugees.html. 
171 UNHCR UGANDA FACT SHEET (Jan. 2020), 
https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Uganda%20Fact%20Sheet%20%20-
%20January%202020_0.pdf. 
172 UNHCR UGANDA COUNTRY REFUGEE RESPONSE PLAN 6 (2019-2020), 
https://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/Uganda%20Country%20RRP%202019-
20%20%28January%202019%29.pdf.  
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2. Registration of New Arrivals 
New arrivals in Uganda are received in reception centers. Due to the refugee influx in 
late 2017, several reception centers have recently been established/expanded.176177 The 
Office of Prime Minister is the responsible authority for the registration and 
documentation of refugees.178 After that, the receiving officer shall inform the registered 
persons of the address of the nearest UNHCR office. A temporary pass shall then be 
issued for registered asylum-seekers as evidence or their request of asylum.179  
Next, an inter-ministerial committee called the Refugee Eligibility Committee (REC) 
decides on the status of refugees. Members of the committee include officials from 
different ministries/departments in Uganda.180181 
Upon receipt of refugee status, refugees obtain cards by which they could enjoy 
privileges similar to those of aliens under the Constitution, as well as rights provided by 
the Refugee Act, which will be explained further in next paragraphs.  
 
3. Right to Work  
The 2006 Refugee Act provides the right to work as in: “right to engage in agriculture, 
industry, handicrafts, and commerce”. The 2010 Refugee Regulations introduced an 
even broader definition of work, that is, “gainful or wage-earning employment”. In 
addition, they provide a refugee exemption from paying charges in order to access 
employment. Regulation (64) reads as follows:  
“A person who has been granted refugee status and is in possession of a valid identity 
card issued by the Commissioner for Refugees, shall, in order to facilitate his or her local 
integration, be allowed to engage in gainful or wage earning employment on the most 
favourable treatment accorded to foreign residents in similar circumstances; except that 
recognised refugees shall exceptionally be exempt from any requirement to pay any 
 
176 UNHCR, supra note 172, at 8. 
177 Id.  
178 Id. 
179 Uganda’s 2010 Refugee Regulations, Regulations (12) and (13). 
180 Hadijah Mwenyango & George Palattiyil, Health needs and challenges of women and children in 
Uganda’s refugee settlements: Conceptualising a role for social work, 62 INT. SOC. WORK 1535 (2019). 
181 REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION: A STUDY OF THE PROCESS IN UGANDA (2018), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/refugee-status-determination---a-study-of-the-process-
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charges or fees prior to the taking up of any offer of or to continue in his or her 
employment.” 
 
4. Right to Education 
The 2006 Refugee Act also provides refugees the right to elementary education on the 
same level of nationals as per Article (29)(e)(iii). The same sub-article provides for their 
right to education beyond elementary schools, such as access to particular studies, at 
least at the same level enjoyed by aliens in Uganda. 
According to the UNHCR Country Refugee Response Plan (RRP) of 2019-2020182, more 
than 60% of refugees in Uganda are minors. Therefore, education for all refugee children 
in Uganda is a critical need. On the bright side, education in Uganda has come a long 
way. Before the Refugee Act was issued in 2006, Refugees did not have the legal right 
to reside outside of camps. The education initiatives that existed at that time in urban 
settings were organized by refugees themselves and not supported by UNHCR, the 
government, or any other entities.183 
 Although refugee children in Uganda have in the meantime the legal right to attend 
public schools, the national education system has problems similar to those in Egypt’s 
education system. These include: overcrowded classrooms (an average of 100 children 
per classroom and up to 300 children, according to a 2018 survey184), poor infrastructure, 
and the lack of qualified teaching capacities.185  
The recent challenge faced by national schools in Uganda was the influx of refugees in 
2017. In the aftermath of conflicts in South Sudan, waves of South Sudanese refugees 
fled to Uganda in April, May, and August 2017. Then, a similar wave of Congolese 
refugees fled conflicts in their country in September 2017. As a result, the national 
schools were over stretched. Some schools were reported to have a number of refugee 
children that was increased by a multiple of five.186 
 
182 UNHCR, supra note 172. 
183 Sarah Dryden-Peterson, Refugee education in countries of first asylum: Breaking open the black box of 
pre-resettlement experiences, 14 THEORY RES. EDUC. 131, 139 (2015). 
184 ROD HICKS & LUCY MAINA, THE IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON SCHOOLS IN UGANDA (2018), 
https://www.britishcouncil.ug/sites/default/files/uganda_schools_language_for_resilience.pdf.  
185 Education for Refugee Children in Uganda - Ash Hartwell (2017-2018), available at: 
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Further, the language barrier is a serious challenge as well. Large numbers of children 
have been reported to be enrolled in grades that are below their educational level due to 
mere language barriers. There are no specific admission/student placement procedures 
set by the Ministry of Sports and Education; it varies from one school to another. Yet, 
refugee children in most schools get placed by an oral interview in English. As a result, if 
a child’s skills in spoken English are weak, they are often placed at a much lower grade 
than they were in their country of origin, even if their skills in science and math are 
relatively advanced.187  
In an attempt to address the language issue, there is a high hiring demand in schools for 
adult refugees who are bilingual and have a teaching experience. The role of those 
teaching assistants (sometimes called language assistants) is to facilitate teaching the 
lessons for refugee children who do not understand the language of learning. However, a 
study suggests that they sometimes end up working not as language assistants but 
rather as teachers, due to the increasing needs for additional teachers at schools. The 
study suggests that it is problematic for assistants to fulfill the teaching and interpreting 
roles at the same time. However, the study praises the policy of hiring them as it has 
been an improvement in the overall learning experience for refugee children. 188 There 
exist helpful non-governmental initiatives as well. A number of NGOs in Kampala provide 
English lessons to refugee children so that they could enroll into education at an 
appropriate age. However, this practice is neither formal nor generalized.189 
On another note, researchers report that many parents are reluctant to enroll their 
children in schools as a result of the general sense of hopelessness prevailing due to 
lack of employment opportunities. Despite the fact access to elementary schools is free, 
the parents of refugees and nationals alike have to pay for school uniforms, meals and a 
so-called repairs fee. As a result, some parents do not enroll their children in elementary 
schools, while the majority tend not to enroll their children in secondary education.190  
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5. Access to Healthcare  
Refugees in Uganda are allowed access to public healthcare facilities at a similar level 
as Ugandans. Even newcomers who just arrived in border regions are allowed 
immediate access to public health centers on a par with nationals. Furthermore, Uganda 
deploys healthcare staff to refugee settlements. It also contributes medical supplies to 
UNHCR refugee operations. 191192 
Nevertheless, Uganda suffers from dilapidated health facilities that are often 
understaffed. Therefore, large numbers of nationals and refugees remain with serious 
health issues.193 
As a consequence, a number of NGOs operate under the coordination and supervision 
of UNHCR to provide healthcare services to refugees.194 
 
6. Other Rights 
Other rights provided by the Refugee Act include: owning movable and immovable 
property, and the right of movement (provided that certain measures are followed).195  
In addition to all the above, Uganda grants refugees pieces of land to build houses on 
and cultivate in order to provide for their needs.196 Since the 1950’s, Uganda adopted the 
approach of giving refugees pieces of land to allow them to engage in farming activities. 
In 1999, Uganda formalized this approach by adopting the self-reliance strategy (SRS), 
jointly developed by the government of Uganda and UNHCR. The strategy aimed at 
turning refugees from “beneficiaries” to “agents of development”. 197198 
 
191 WHO, HEALTH OF REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS: PRACTICES IN ADDRESSING THE HEALTH NEEDS OF REFUGEES AND 
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In the meantime, most land reserved by the state for refugees are located in the West 
and the North. In areas where no land is reserved, the Department of Refugees 
negotiates with local communities to allow refugees to be placed on a piece of land. In 
return, the government promises to improve infrastructure and services in those areas.199 
 
7. Discourse on Uganda’s Policies 
Frank Ahimbisibwe, the author of the Legal Status of Refugee Protection and State 
Obligations in Uganda argues that some of the Act’s provisions violate the 1951 
Convention. For example, section 40(1) states that the Minister could, upon consultation 
with the concerned Minister, order the expulsion of any refugee causing a threat to 
national security or public order. In another article of his, Rwandan Refugee Rights in 
Uganda: Analysis of Law and Practice, Ahimbisibwe argues that there is discrepancy 
between law and practice with regards to refugee rights in Uganda. According to 
Ahimbisibwe, refugees in Uganda are legally entitled to non-discrimination as per 
Uganda’s domestic law as well as its international obligations. 200 
On one hand, Uganda’s constitution states that: “a person shall not be discriminated 
against on the ground of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, 
social or economic standing, political opinion or disability.”201 Moreover, the 2006 
Refugee Act states that refugees are “entitled to fair and just treatment without 
discrimination on grounds of race, religion, sex, nationality, ethnic identity, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion.”202 
Furthermore, the right to non-discrimination is emphasized in both the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention to which Uganda is a Party. Article (3) of the 
1951 Convention states that: “the Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this 
Convention to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin”. 
Meanwhile, Article (4) of the 1969 OAU Convention states that: “Member States 
undertake to apply the provisions of this Convention to all refugees without discrimination 
as to race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinions.” 
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Despite all the emphasis on non-discrimination in domestic and international law, the 
author argues that Uganda violated its obligation towards Rwandan refugees in 2009, as 
it famously prevented Rwandan refugees, and no other groups of refugees, from 
cultivation and reduced their food rations.203204 The timing of the cultivation ban coincided 
with efforts by the government to promote ‘voluntary’ repatriation of refugees.205 
Consequently, Amnesty International published a memorandum indicating its “grave 
concern” about the situation, and questioning Uganda’s commitment to the principles of 
non-discrimination and non-refoulement.206 Furthermore, a report prepared by various 
international organizations and research institution condemned the reduction of food 
rations that has been exclusively imposed on Rwandan refugees and stated that it acted, 
against international law, as a tool to repatriate.207    
The author further reports another incident that took place in 2010 when Rwandan 
asylum-seekers whose asylum has been rejected by the Refugee Eligibility Committee 
were deported to Rwanda without having the opportunity to appeal the Committee’s 
decision.208 
Moreover, Uganda’s approach to self-reliance by giving refugee slots of land to cultivate 
has been reported to have some drawbacks. On one hand, not all refugees manage to 
be self-reliant due to the small size of the land slots and the infertile soil in some cases. 
In addition, some refugees have reported not being used to farming, neither as a 
profession nor as a lifestyle.209 
On a related note, it has been found that the size of land slots, as well as the amount of 
food rations, often differ from one refugee to another as per the region he/she settles in 
and the time he/she has arrived in Uganda. This inequality, although clearly unintended 
to discriminate, has been reported to cause tensions among refugee communities. 
Similarly, family members of existing refugees might arrive in Uganda at a later stage 
than their relatives, seek asylum, and receive land slots in regions distant from their 
 
203 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA ABOUT THE CESSATION OF REFUGEE 
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family. As a result, family members choose to stay together at the expense of sharing a 
relatively small land slot as well as limited food rations.210    
Although Uganda is reportedly one of the most progressive countries in terms of refugee 
policies, various publicists have had doubts whether Uganda adopts its open-door policy 
in good faith or not. For example, there exists an argument that Uganda is taking 
advantage of the international aid transferred to it as well as the taxes it imposes on 
commodities procured in the service of refugees.211  
Publicists report that refugees in Uganda are regarded by some nationals as beneficial 
for the economy since they buy local commodities. It has been reported that every new 
refugee household increases the total income of all households in Uganda (including 
those of refugees) by around $400 more than the aid that the new household receives 
(and even a larger amount when aid is given in cash, rather than food rations; as cash 
enables them to buy local commodities produced by other households). It was also 
reported in 2016 that the consumption of households in Uganda has increased due to the 
influx of Congolese refugees.212 Some publicists argue that refugees in Uganda are 
regarded by some nationals as an attraction for foreign aid. It is reported that some 
nationals in poor Northern areas pose themselves as refugees in order to receive aid.213  
On the bright side, publicists report that the aforementioned public perspective of 
refugees contributes to the general welcoming attitude of locals towards refugees, 
especially in areas where new schools and water systems are established for refugees 
as well as their host communities.214  
Furthermore, two academics have published on a news site an article named: “Is 
Uganda really a 'refugee paradise'?” in response to a story on Uganda that was 
published in a Dutch media platform. They have argued that there are hidden interests in 
portraying Uganda as a “refugee paradise”, which is an image that serves an agenda for 
both the EU and Uganda’s government.215 
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On one hand, they argue that the EU has had an increasing interest in the 
‘externalization of its asylum policy, tackling the migration issue at its roots”, that is, 
global south countries.216 On the other hand, the authors argue that Uganda is using the 
propaganda to deflect attention from its authoritarian practices by the current regime, 
such as its recent efforts to allow presidency for life.217  
Moreover, the authors add that the story published by the Dutch media outlet turns a 
blind eye to several challenges faced by refugees in Uganda. To name a few: the fact 
that most refugees are situated in areas that are underdeveloped with high rates of 
poverty, incidents that took place over the past years of locals attacking refugees or not 
allowing them to locate on their land, etc.218 
Similarly, a report by the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) seems to share the 
previous view. It refers to Uganda’s positioning itself in the eyes of the international 
community as an ally to the West in its war against terror, a participant in peace 
operations in Africa, and a showcase for progressive refugee policies. The authors argue 
that western countries, in return, turn a blind eye to repressive policies imposed by the 
government of Uganda on a domestic level.219 
The authors further argue that the refugee situation in Uganda requires a “brave” 
discussion on an international level on durable solutions, other than the constantly 
promoted option of voluntary repatriation, and the concept of “shared responsibility”. 
They call for an increase in the number of refugees to be resettled in wealthier countries 
around the globe.220  
On the other hand, there were incidents of corruption in the refugee administration 
system that were reported by UNHCR in late 2017. As a consequence, senior refugee 
officials were suspended in 2018 due to reports of fraud by the UN. The breaches 
included extortion and faking increased refugee numbers in order to receive aid for 
beneficiaries that did not exist.221 In addition, the government and UNHCR have verified 
the numbers of refugees across the country using UNHCR biometric systems. The 
verification process lasted from March to October. Furthermore, an agreement has been 
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established between the government and UNHCR that the Office of Prime Minister will 
use UNHCR enhanced biometric systems to register new refugees.222 
Those have been the main arguments raised in the discourse on Uganda’s refugee 
policies by academics and experts. Despite Uganda’s largely-progressive policies 
towards refugees, some have expressed concerns with regards to a few legal provisions, 
potential political agendas, and certain incidents (such as the 2009 cultivation ban). In 
the next chapter I will conclude with recommendations based on all the above. 
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V. Conclusion  
A. Reflections on the Three Models 
This research has aimed to fill a gap in the field of comparative refugee law as there is 
no available scholarship attempting to compare Egypt’s laws with regards to refugees to 
other countries’ except for one academic article. Most of the scholarship available is 
tackling each country’s legal system on its own. Nevertheless, those academic articles 
have been of a great use for this research, as it has relied on them for the most part to 
obtain information and present existing discourse. 
As explained above, the causes of challenges faced by refugees in Egypt include: 
Egypt’s not committing to its international obligations, UNHCR taking up Egypt’s 
responsibilities, and the outdated MoU between Egypt and UNHCR office in Egypt. 
In both Egypt’s and Jordan’s models, political events have impacted the treatment of 
refugees. Another common feature between the two models is the unequal treatment 
between refugees on the basis of nationality, especially in access to healthcare (in 
Jordan’s model), and public education (in Egypt’s model). This has been a serious 
aspect of criticism argued by several academics and organizations. 223 
While Jordan is not a signatory to specified Refugee treaties, Egypt is a party to both the 
1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention and is expected to abide by 
their provisions. By treating refugees differently on basis of nationality in aspects such as 
access to education, right to establish community-based organizations, and more, Egypt 
is breaching its international obligations as per the 1951 Convention and the 1969 OAU 
Convention, namely the non-discrimination principle enshrined in Article (3) and Article 
(4) respectively in both conventions. It does not meet its obligations as per CRC and 
ICESCR either. 
An obstacle that hinders any possible progressiveness of Egypt’s refugee legal 
framework is the existence of many decrees and bilateral agreements of relevance. 
Some of those instruments are long forgotten or not implemented for one reason or 
another. As for the bilateral agreements, they are not always reflected in domestic law. 
 
223 As mentioned earlier, a similar discrimination upon nationality reportedly took place in some incidents in 
Uganda (such as the 2009 cultivation ban against Rwandan). refugees). However, this practice has been 
limited to a few separate incidents, unlike the situation in Jordan and Egypt, where refugees in Egypt and 
Jordan receive different treatment on the basis of their nationality by force of law. 
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As for the administrative orders/decrees, they are sometimes unknown to the concerned 
officials (e.g. healthcare providers). The solution in my opinion is to identify the best 
treatment provided by these instruments, codify it in a body of domestic law (such as 
Uganda’s Refugee Act), and to provide it to refugees of all nationalities without 
discrimination. 
Indeed, Uganda’s Refugee Act has been an exemplary body of law that provides the 
most important citizen-rights, especially in comparison to Egypt’s and Jordan’s models of 
scattered laws and decrees. The Refugee Act is generally praised for meeting Uganda’s 
obligations in accordance with the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol, the OAU 
Convention, and other international treaties. 
However, it is not untrue to say that there are avenues of improvement that should yet be 
explored in Uganda’s law. For example, a few law provisions in Uganda’s Refugee Act 
that are said to violate the concept of non-refoulement present in the 1951 Convention 
could be amended.  
Nevertheless, several lessons could still be learned from Uganda’s model and applied to 
Egypt’s model. For example, efforts could be explored in Egypt to apply a practice like 
the refugee land ownership and cultivation in Uganda, but in a manner that would 
accommodate the cultural and societal circumstances of refugees in Egypt, since the 
refugee population in Egypt lives in urban settings. A national program could be 
established where refugees are encouraged to start their own businesses, while UNHCR 
could assign part of its budget to support those small businesses. As it is in Jordan’s 
SEZs, refugee business owners might be required to hire a certain quota of refugee 
employees in exchange for administrative facilitation of their license renewal. And as it is 
with the land ownership in Uganda, refugee business owners could be allowed after a 
certain period of time to own the properties at which they operate their businesses and to 
receive permeant residence.  
As for the education sector, there are useful practices in Uganda that could be imitated in 
Egyptian schools. For example, “language assistants”, similar to those hired in Ugandan 
schools, could be hired in Egyptian schools upon the inclusion of non-Arabic speaking 
refugee children. CMRS researchers argue that the language barriers might be a reason 
for the Ministerial policy of not allowing refugee children of sub-Saharan countries to 
enter public Egyptian schools.224 The authors recommend that these children are to be 
 
224 CMRS Report, supra note 8, at 150. 
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assigned a place for education and to be given mandatory Arabic classes to allow their 
integration in the system. In the process of their education and integration, job 
opportunities will be provided to adult refugees from their communities.225 I agree with 
that recommendation as it has proven to be beneficial in Ugandan schools. 
Last but not least, I agree with Tarek Badawy’s call for a hybrid RSD system in Egypt 
where UNHCR conducts RSD and Egypt manages the appeal system to RSD decisions. 
This would allow UNHCR to save a lot of its resources and channel them to support 
public facilities that serve both nationals and refugees, especially in the education and 
healthcare sectors. 
 
B. Principled Pragmatism: I Say Why Not? 
As this research has demonstrated, host countries in the global south can take 
advantage of adopting progressive policies towards refugees. Benefits include foreign 
aid provided by western countries with the aim to “contain migration in the south”. As a 
report by IRRI concludes, Uganda’s progressive refugee policies largely owe to the 
global political climate that allowed, and encouraged, the adoption of these policies 
without Uganda having to pay a high price domestically.226 This global political climate 
has also allowed Jordan to pass the Jordan Compact, turning a restrictive environment to 
a relatively-progressive one for Syrian refugees. 
However, both countries’ approaches were criticized. On one hand, concerns exist on 
whether the propaganda on Uganda’s progressive policies distract donor countries from 
seeing the reality of life for refugees in the country, including incidents of conflict with the 
locals as well as high poverty rates.227 There are also questions on whether this 
propaganda serves an EU agenda of keeping the migrants in Africa, and whether it has 
been used in bad faith to turn attention away from some of the Ugandan regime 
practices. On the other hand, Jordan is criticized for using its refugee policies to pressure 
donor states for additional, direct transfer of aid. 
While some (or all) of these arguments might be valid, practicality requires us to weigh 
the outcomes of those policies. And the outcomes are promising. In Uganda, refugees 
are treated on a par with nationals in several aspects, while in Jordan, an exceptionally 
 
225 CMRS Report, supra note 8, at 152. 
226  Hovil, supra note 197, at 15. 
227 Schiltz & Titeca, supra note 215.  
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large number of work permits have been issued since the enforcement of the Compact. 
In my opinion, the timing could not be more convenient for Egypt to take a similar path 
while drawing on the lessons learned from previous approaches of Uganda, Jordan, and 
other refugee-hosting countries in the global south.  
In case a Refugee Compact is to be formulated in Egypt, it is important to avoid the 
drawbacks reported of the Jordan Compact. As recommended by humanitarian experts, 
it is crucial to integrate the perspectives of refugees themselves, UNHCR, NGOs that 
have been operating in the refugee scene, and civil society in the making stage of such 
approaches. It is also necessary (as per international law) to avoid restricting the scope 
of their application to certain nationalities while leaving the rest to suffer.  
Indeed, progressive approaches like refugee compacts come with a price. The burden 
added to the already stretched public services of the poor, highly populated countries 
has been a difficult political choice for countries in the global south that host refugees. It 
is noticeably one of the reasons hindering Egypt and Jordan from allowing free and equal 
access to refugees to public facilities. However, it did not stop Uganda from bringing 
together a legislation that is in line, in most part, with the UN Refugee Convention as well 
as other international accords. Despite the modest quality of services provided in public 
facilities, Uganda impressively continues to allow refugees’ access on a par with 
nationals to schools, healthcare, and the labor market. 
On another hand, Uganda’s refugee situation proved that refugees could act as buyers of 
local goods, increasing overall consumption, and contributing to the businesses that 
revive the host country’s economy. What I call for, based on my research, is for Egypt to 
make use of this historical moment where donor countries, and the EU in particular, is 
willing to provide aid and investment opportunities for countries taking up what is 
perceived as the ‘heavy duty’ of hosting migrants.  
It is true that so far the EU has not yet shown much substantial concern for the well-
being of migrants (as indicated by its support to the Libyan coastguards, notoriously 
known for their violence against migrants228). However, what has inspired me with a 
mood of optimism is the existence of a few promising, unprejudiced voices of certain 
weighty members of the EU. For instance, Angela Merkel has welcomed a large number 
of Syrian refugees in her country and urged other countries of the EU to share in the 
 
228 Charles Heller et al., ‘It’s an Act of Murder’: How Europe Outsources Suffering as Migrants Drown, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Dec. 26, 2018), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/26/opinion/europe-
migrant-crisis-mediterranean-libya.html. 
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human responsibility of accommodating them.229 Another important figure in the EU who 
has, also, shown similar concern for the refugees is Emmanuel Macron. Thousands of 
refugees have been given legal status to reside in France with a plan in place (designed 
by Macron’s administration) to help them find jobs and integrate into their new society 
with the help of young French citizens. Paid community service has been used as a tool 
to help young refugees have their goals set pertaining to what they would like to learn 
and do. They also learn the language through state-funded classes.230 
On the other side, I am aware of the rise of anti-immigrant right wing (for example, 
Alternative for Germany (AfD), the far-right party in Germany that won the third place in 
state elections last year231). Nevertheless, the main concerns for right wingers as 
indicated explicitly by their promotional campaigns is fear of losing their national identity 
and culture (or as put by an AfD controversial poster: “Burkas? No, we prefer bikinis”232). 
Therefore, I believe that those far-right parties will be on board with proposals like the 
Jordan compact, as long as migrants remain in transit countries in the global south.       
In that sense, an approach that is both pragmatic and principled could be proposed by 
Egypt to the international community in the same manner Jordan has done. The 
approach could include a number of policy reforms with an aim of meeting the 
international standards, to which Egypt has already committed itself, in exchange for 
relaxed trade regulations, investment opportunities, and international aid that could be 
channeled to improve public facilities in Egypt. Lessons from past approaches of other 
countries should then be drawn to ensure the best outcome hoped for: an improved, 
dignified quality of life for both nationals and refugees.     
 
229 Alison Smale & Barbara Surk, Angela Merkel Calls for United Europe to Address Migrant Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES, (Oct. 7, 2015), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/world/europe/angela-merkel-calls-
for-united-europe-to-address-migrant-crisis.html. 
230 Annabelle Timsit, France has a compassionate plan to help young refugees make friends and get jobs 
(Oct. 2018), available at: https://qz.com/1410589/macrons-creative-plan-to-help-refugees-in-france-
assimilate/. 
231 Titus Molkenbur & Luke Cooper, The AfD is gaining strength in Germany. A reformed EU can stop it, 
GUARDIAN, (Sept. 3, 2019), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/03/afd-
germany-reformed-eu-immigration-parties-europe. 
232 Germany's AfD: How right-wing is nationalist Alternative for Germany?, BBC, (Feb. 11, 2020), available 
at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37274201. 
